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ARTICLE
THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE
Kate Sablosky Elengold
ABSTRACT
This Article names and identifies the “investment imperative”
as the widely-held belief that higher education is necessary to
increase one’s financial prosperity and social standing in America.
Increasingly, higher education policy has supported the
investment imperative by shifting the benefit, burden, and risk of
higher education from the public to the private consumer. This has
resulted in a patchwork of laws that encourage education at any
cost, primarily driven by personal debt, and without concomitant
regulations that control for instructional quality.
Drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship, empirical studies,
and original interviews with student loan borrowers across the
country, this Article argues that the investment imperative drives
and distorts students’ financial behaviors and decisions. Because
students are conditioned to see higher education as an imperative
investment in their own human capital, many fail to connect
college attendance with college financing. More specifically, this
Article argues that the investment imperative (1) permits and
encourages an “ostrich effect,” whereby student borrowers ignore
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information about higher education institutions and the cost of
debt; and (2) creates the conditions for a “student debt cascade,”
whereby the disconnect between the financial promise of higher
education and the student’s financial reality leads to distress
emotions, avoidance, nonpayment, and default. Throughout, this
Article recognizes that, in its implementation, the investment
imperative leaves students vulnerable to exploitation and ignores
the effects of systemic inequalities related to race, gender, and
class.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the founding of this nation, Americans have touted the
promise of social and economic advancement through hard work.1
It is the cornerstone of the American Dream. And there is
widespread belief that, today, higher education is a key to that
advancement.2 Increasing one’s socioeconomic status has, in fact,
become so intertwined with higher education that it is difficult to
separate what this Article names the “investment imperative”
from individual decisions to seek higher education.
The investment imperative is the widely-held belief that
higher education is necessary to increase one’s financial prosperity
and social standing in America. This Article argues that the
investment imperative is a driving force behind students’ financial
behavior and decisions about higher education and student debt,
often distorting that decision-making. And while higher education
is not a monolith, and postsecondary students are diverse in every
measure, the investment imperative surfaces as a theme across
institutions and students.
This imperative did not simply emerge out of our culture.
Higher education policy throughout the last century has supported
and stoked the investment imperative. Beginning with the Morrill
Land-Grant Acts, the federal government took an active role in
higher education.3 One major aim of higher education legislation
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 187–88 (Francis Bowen ed.,
Henry Reeve trans., Sever & Francis 1862) (1840); see also RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN
LIFE 27 (1990) (“I learned that hard work is an essential part of life—that by and large, you
don’t get something for nothing—and that America was a place that offered unlimited
opportunity to those who did work hard.”).
2. See, e.g., BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 159 (1st ed. 2006) (“Throughout
our history, education has been at the heart of a bargain this nation makes with its citizens:
If you work hard and take responsibility, you’ll have a chance for a better life.”); infra note
71 and accompanying text. In reality, this is not the case for all of those who seek
postsecondary education. See TRESSIE MCMILLAN COTTOM, LOWER ED: THE TROUBLING
RISE OF FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES IN THE NEW ECONOMY 13–14 (2017) (highlighting the
financial risks for those who attend for-profit colleges and universities); Katherine Porter,
College Lessons: The Financial Risks of Dropping Out, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS
THE MIDDLE CLASS 85, 85–86 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (explaining that those who have
“some college,” but no degree, are at a disproportionately high risk for financial failure);
DARRICK HAMILTON ET AL., UMBRELLAS DON’T MAKE IT RAIN: WHY STUDYING AND WORKING
HARD ISN’T ENOUGH FOR BLACK AMERICANS 3 (2015), http://insightcced.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/Umbrellas_Dont_Make_It_Rain_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V4C
-WKUB] (arguing that education alone does not explain economic well-being, especially
when viewed across races).
3. See SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID,
AND THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 12–14, 86–88 (2016) (tracing the legal history
of college access legislation, including the Morrill Act of 1862, the Servicemen’s
Readjustment Act of 1944, the report of the Truman Commission in 1947, the National
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has been to increase access to bolster individual and societal
advancement.4 That push for increased access to higher
education—in aggregate terms—has been a success.5 The Morrill
Act of 1862 led to the creation of forty-eight land-grant colleges6
and the G.I. Bill, passed in 1944, led to a major increase in
veterans seeking higher education.7 Each decade since the passage
of the Higher Education Act in 1965 has brought a significant
increase in college attendance. At last count, at least twenty
million American adults were enrolled in some form of higher
education.8 That number grew by 14 percent in the last decade and
is expected to increase by almost the same amount in the next
decade.9
As this Article details, however, federal higher education
policy has increasingly treated postsecondary education as a
private, rather than a public, good. That has led to a patchwork of
laws that encourage education at ever-increasing costs,10
Defense Education Act of 1958, the Higher Education Act of 1965 and its subsequent
amendments, the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978, and the College Cost
Reduction and Access Act of 2007).
4. Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
1561, 1575–76 (2015) (recognizing that the primary goal of the Higher Education Act was
to “put college within reach of any student who wanted to go, regardless of that student’s
means”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Educ., Fact Sheet: Increasing College Access by
Making Loans Easier to Pay (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/factsheet-increasing-college-access-making-loans-easier-pay [https://perma.cc/7URJ-PSDW]
(“Higher education continues to be the single most important investment students can
make in themselves and the surest engine to enter the middle class.”).
5. But see infra Section II.B for a discussion of those who have been excluded from
higher education.
6. David J. Staley, Democratizing American Higher Education: The Legacy of the
Morrill Land Grant Act, ORIGINS, Jan. 2013, at 1.
7. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC 139–40 (2003) (“Of the more than 15
million eligible veterans, about half took advantage of these educational benefits: 2.2
million attended college or post-graduate study, 3.5 million enrolled in other schooling, 1.4
million chose on-the-job training, and 700,000 sought farm training.”).
8. The most comprehensive data on higher education are collected and disseminated
by the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) National Postsecondary Student
Aid Study (NPSAS). NCES is a unit of the U.S. Department of Education. The most recent
data were released in January of 2018, covering 2015–2016. See RADWIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2018-466, 2015–2016 NATIONAL POSTSECONDARY STUDENT
AID STUDY (NPSAS:16) (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018466.pdf [https://perma
.cc/NYZ5-L272] for the most recent NPSAS. These numbers do not account for the more
than 400,000 adults enrolled in postsecondary-school certificate and nondegree granting
programs during that time. SNYDER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2017094, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2016, at 399–400 (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs
2017/2017094.pdf [https://perma.cc/67PD-ZSLW].
9. SNYDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 399–400.
10. In the last decade, the annual cost for one undergraduate year at a public
nonprofit institution increased by 34 percent and the annual cost for one undergraduate
year at a private nonprofit institution increased by 26 percent. Id. at 403. For-profit
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primarily driven by personal debt, and without concomitant
regulations that control for instructional quality. Access has
increasingly been supported through the proliferation of
unsubsidized loans on the front end, a rise in largely unregulated
postsecondary institutions in the middle, and punitive collection
tools on the back end.11
Unsurprisingly, the consumption of higher education under
the current regulatory framework has problematic consequences.
Student debt has skyrocketed, delinquency and default are on the
rise, and students have been left vulnerable to predatory
institutions. Students are increasingly financing their higher
education with debt, tapping into both public and private credit
sources.12 As of May 2019, nearly forty-four million Americans
were carrying student debt, and the cumulative debt load was
$1.49 trillion.13 The average balance per borrower now hovers
around $30,000.14 Not only are more borrowers taking on more
education debt, but those borrowers are also having increasing
difficulty repaying their loans. Student loan delinquency now
institutions have had a slightly different history, whereby their costs have decreased over
the last decade. Id.
11. See Daniela Kraiem, The Cost of Opportunity: Student Debt and Social Mobility,
48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 689, 702–04, 714 (2015) (arguing that higher education policy has
been driven by an “education is a commodity” metaphor, including the focus on higher
education as an investment in an individual’s human capital); see also Robert Shireman,
Learn Now, Pay Later: A History of Income-Contingent Student Loans in the United States,
671 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 184, 185, 191 (2017) (“Instead of using coercion,
the United States promotes higher education through exhortation, with the most common
argument not about the social benefits, but instead about the individual earnings gains
associated with college degrees.”).
12. SALLIE MAE, HOW AMERICA PAYS FOR COLLEGE 12 (2017), https://www.salliema
e.com/assets/Research/HAP/HowAmericaPaysforCollege2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5MR
-NL4U] (detailing data from 2017 that showed that borrowed money accounted for 27
percent of education costs, which was up from 20 percent the prior year); KEVIN MILLER,
AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, DEEPER IN DEBT: WOMEN AND STUDENT LOANS 11–12 (2017),
https://www.aauw.org/aauw_check/pdf_download/show_pdf.php?file=deeper-in-debt [https
://perma.cc/478D-VAMJ].
13. RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT
ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT (2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/
interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2019Q1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG27-E6M9].
Different organizations put this number at different amounts. For example, LendEDU
reports that, as of August 2019, the cumulative student debt load was $1.61 trillion.
Average Student Loan Debt Statistics for 2019, LENDEDU (Aug. 19, 2019), https://lend
edu.com/blog/average-student-loan-debt-statistics [https://perma.cc/EBE3-T8SD] (citing
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, Student Loans Owned and Securitized, Outstanding,
FRED, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLOAS [https://perma.cc/LKV9-Z64B?type=image]
(last updated Aug. 7, 2019)).
14. Robert Kelchen, Examining Average Student Loan Balances by State, ROBERT
KELCHEN (Feb. 1, 2018), https://robertkelchen.com/2018/02/01/examining-average-studentloan-balances-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/P2PK-57GS] (relying on the most recentlyavailable data from the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid).
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accounts for the principal kind of household debt default,
exceeding credit card, mortgage, auto loan, and home equity
revolving debt.15
Importantly, these negative effects of student debt
disproportionally burden women, people of color, members of the
LGBTQ community, and students from poor families. Women, for
example, represent 57 percent of college students, but hold twothirds of the nation’s student debt.16 Black undergraduates borrow
more than their White counterparts.17 The most recent federal
data reflects an astounding figure: 30 percent of Black student
borrowers owe more than $100,000, compared to just 12 percent of
their White counterparts.18 And LGBTQ borrowers reported an
average of $16,000 more student debt than the general
population.19 In addition to individual circumstances, there are
15. See RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 13.
This is particularly true for students attending for-profit institutions. See infra notes 117–
19 and accompanying text.
16. MILLER, supra note 12, at 1 (“[M]any do not think of student debt as a women’s
issue despite the fact that women represented 56 percent of those enrolled in American
colleges and universities in fall 2016. This report reveals that they also take on larger
student loans than do men. And because of the gender pay gap, they have less disposable
income with which to repay their loans after graduating from college, so they require more
time to pay back their student debt than do men. As a result, women hold nearly two-thirds
of the outstanding student debt in the United States.”).
17. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 90; see also SARA GOLDRICK-RAB ET AL., THE
COLOR OF STUDENT DEBT: IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL LOAN PROGRAM REFORMS FOR BLACK
STUDENTS AND HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 14–15 (2014), https://ne
ws.education.wisc.edu/docs/WebDispenser/news-connections-pdf/thecolorofstudentdebt-dr
aft.pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/RQV2-QDZF] (arguing that the racial wealth gap
explains much of the borrowing discrepancy between Black and White undergraduates);
MARK HUELSMAN, DEMOS, THE DEBT DIVIDE: THE RACIAL AND CLASS BIAS BEHIND THE
“NEW NORMAL” OF STUDENT BORROWING 2, 9–10 figs. 2, 3, & 4 (2015), https://www.de
mos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Mark-Debt%20divide%20Final%20%28SF%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LW6F-7BRV] (depicting data showing that Black and low-income
students borrow more and more often to finance their undergraduate studies). Cf. Sandy
Baum, Student Debt: Where Is the Crisis?, 7 UC IRVINE L. REV. 21, 36–37 (2017) (arguing
that Black undergraduates graduate with higher levels of debt than other racial and ethnic
groups due to a combination of for-profit enrollment, borrowing at older ages, independence
from family, longer completion times, lower family income, and lower family wealth).
18. Robert Kelchen, Examining Trends in Graduate Student Debt by Race and
Ethnicity, ROBERT KELCHEN (May 15, 2018), https://robertkelchen.com/2018/05/15/examini
ng-trends-in-graduate-student-debt-by-race-and-ethnicity/ [https://perma.cc/T7UZ-J9FN];
Robert Kelchen, What Explains Racial Gaps in Large Graduate Student Debt Burdens?,
ROBERT KELCHEN (May 17, 2018), https://robertkelchen.com/2018/05/17/what-expl
ains-racial-gaps-in-large-graduate-student-debt-burdens/ [https://perma.cc/DHD8-NFJK]
(finding, through a regression analysis on these data controlling for gender, age, marital
status, level of study, institution type, and field of study, a strong suggestion that “the
[B]lack/[W]hite gap in large student debt burdens cannot be explained by other
demographic characteristics or individuals’ fields of study”).
19. Carmen Reinicke, Student Debt Is Crushing Dreams for This Group, CNBC (July
23, 2018, 11:17 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/20/there-are-added-risks--lgbtq-

57 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2019)

2019]

THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE

7

systemic factors connected to these discrepancies—gender and
racial income gaps, intergenerational class and race wealth gaps,
redlining, poor-quality elementary and secondary education and
counseling, and social and familial rejection, to name a few.
Further, students who attend for-profit postsecondary
institutions, which reflect a higher default rate,20 are
disproportionately female, African American, older, and parents.21
This Article argues that the investment imperative does not
simply exist as a matter of form in higher education policy; it is
also the driving force behind students’ financial behavior and
decisions around higher education and student debt. By
prioritizing college attendance above all, the investment
imperative drives and distorts students’ financial decisionmaking. It then leaves students, especially those with limited
opportunity or significant debt, vulnerable to exploitation.
This Article identifies and explores two specific decisionmaking distortions and their consequences.22
First, the investment imperative permits and encourages
students to decouple their decision-making about attendance at an
institution of higher education from financing that attendance.
Understanding higher education as a genuine imperative distorts
a rational cost-benefit analysis. This Article argues that the
investment imperative thus creates an “ostrich effect,”23 whereby
student-loan-borrowers.html [https://perma.cc/R2Y2-CRBQ] (citing to a study by Student
Loan Hero of 11,000 student borrowers who identify as LGBTQ).
20. See infra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
21. See For-Profit Colleges: By the Numbers, CTR. FOR ANALYSIS POSTSECONDARY
EDUC. & EMP., https://capseecenter.org/research/by-the-numbers/for-profit-college-infogra
phic/ [https://perma.cc/8NFK-9MEN] (last updated Feb. 2018). In New York’s schools, for
example, 72 percent of Black for-profit students defaulted on their loans within twelve
years, relative to 25 percent of their Black peers who attended public and nonprofit New
York colleges. See YAN CAO, THE CENTURY FOUND., GRADING NEW YORK’S COLLEGES 3
(2018), https://production-tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2018/03/26094105/grading-new-yorkscolleges.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT97-SXGV]. Both of those numbers are high relative to their
White peers. Id. White for-profit students defaulted on their loans at a nearly 40 percent
rate and White nonprofit students defaulted on their loans at a 9 percent rate. Id.
22. See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of the decision-making distortions and
their consequences. While the normative consequences do not ring true for every student
borrower, these themes are prevalent enough in quantitative studies, qualitative studies
(including the one contained herein), and the literature to warrant significant concern and
further study.
23. The “ostrich effect” is used in cognitive science and behavioral economics and
refers to the preference to focus on positive information and avoid negative information.
See Peter H. Huang, Achieving American Retirement Prosperity by Changing Americans’
Thinking About Retirement, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 189, 231–32 (2017) (citing Russell
Golman & George Loewenstein, Curiosity, Information Gaps, and the Utility of Knowledge
(Apr. 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/sds/docs/golman/C
uriosity%2C%20Information%20Gaps%2C%20and%20the%20Utility%20of%20Knowledge
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student borrowers ignore the costs of their attendance, fail to seek
or understand information about the rights and responsibilities
associated with their loans, fail to seek advice or assistance with
their loans, and fall prey to scams and misinformation directed at
chronically under-informed borrowers.
Second, the investment imperative risks overpromising
students certain financial outcomes from attaining a college
certification or degree by instilling overconfidence in their ability
to repay education debt. This is particularly perilous where
information asymmetry between lender/institution and student is
combined with a failure to hold institutions accountable for their
graduates’ negative outcomes. For many, graduation comes with
the start of student loan repayment and the shock that, in part
because of their education debt, borrowers do not have the
financial stability that the investment imperative promised. This
causes a “student debt cascade,” wherein the disconnect between
the financial promise of the investment imperative does not align
with the graduate’s financial reality, leading to distress emotions
(i.e., shame and fear), avoidance, and default. This student debt
cascade has negative financial implications for the borrower, her
family, and her lender—the American taxpayer.24
To support these theories, this Article looks to both
interdisciplinary scholarship and original qualitative data. The
original data comes from sixty-five in-depth, semi-structured
interviews from 2017 and 2018 with student borrowers in ten
American cities. These data, along with the existing literature, are

%20Golman_Loewenstein%20April%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4SL-TGAB]; Geoffrey
P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex
Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 818 (2010)
(citing Niklas Karlsson et al., The Ostrich Effect: Selective Attention to Information, 38 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 96 (2009)) (“The ostrich effect is the tendency for market actors
to ignore news, data, or analysis that imply negative outcomes.”). The term was originally
coined by Dan Galai and Orly Sade. Dan Galai & Orly Sade, The “Ostrich Effect” and the
Relationship Between the Liquidity and the Yields of Financial Assets, 79 J. BUS. 2741,
2743–44 (2006) (defining “ostrich effect” as “avoiding apparently risky financial situations
by pretending they do not exist”). Similar language and constructs have been used in the
bankruptcy literature. See Pamela Foohey, When Faith Falls Short: Bankruptcy Decisions
of Churches, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1319, 1345 (2015) (“The term ‘ostrich defense’ is most
commonly associated with how individuals tend to approach their increasingly precarious
finances. . . . [T]hey refuse to deal with their situations because they believe better financial
times lay ahead or because they simply do not want to admit failure.”); Ronald J. Mann &
Katherine Porter, Saving up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 313 (2010) (describing
debtors’ use of avoidance techniques prior to filing for bankruptcy or to deter collection as
the “ostrich defense”).
24. Approximately 90 percent of student loans are federal loans. John R. Brooks, The
Case for More Debt: Expanding College Affordability by Expanding Income-Driven
Repayment, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 847, 851.
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used to explain and explore the real effects of the investment
imperative on students and their families.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II sets out the legal
history and current facts related to higher education access. It
traces the investment imperative’s imprint on the law’s push for
higher education through a series of statutes designed to increase
access to college. In other words, it sets out how the investment
imperative has been supported by the supply side—through
policymaking and by postsecondary institutions. It recognizes the
overwhelming success of that push, setting forth data both in the
aggregate and across decades, institutions, degrees, and students.
Yet it acknowledges that there are those who have been excluded.
Part II also explores the financial costs of increased access to
higher education and the ways that financing responsibility has
shifted from public entities to students and their families. Part III
traces the existence of the investment imperative on the demand
side—from the perspective of students. It introduces the original
qualitative data, layering the data on top of existing
interdisciplinary research to explore how borrowers experience the
investment imperative. Part IV then identifies the ways in which
the investment imperative drives and distorts consumers’
decision-making, especially with respect to financing higher
education. It defines and explores the ostrich effect and the
student debt cascade as consequences of that distortion.
Whether the investment imperative is a net positive or a net
negative is beyond the scope of this Article. The purpose of this
Article is to name, identify, and explore the investment imperative
and consider how it has operated to drive policymaking and distort
consumer decision-making. It makes no claim as to whether access
to higher education should be an imperative for all Americans. Nor
should this Article be read as a critique of legislative and other
efforts to increase access to higher education. Rather, this Article
evidences how the concept of higher education as an investment
imperative is affecting the way students think about and finance
their postsecondary education. And it shows how those effects
leave students, particularly low-income students, students of
color, and female students, vulnerable to exploitation. At the end
of the day, the way that higher education’s investment imperative
has been adopted, implemented, and exploited disproportionately
burdens communities that have historically been excluded from
access to higher education and other forms of wealth development
and social mobility.
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II. THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE IMPRINT
Historically, higher education was seen as a public good.
Beginning with the Morrill Act of 1862, Congress passed a series
of acts that focused on increasing access to higher education. The
passage of the Higher Education Act (HEA) in 1965 represented
the “high-water mark” for federal legislative support aimed at
increasing access to higher education.25 Every decade following its
passage has brought an increase in postsecondary education
enrollment. The legislative push for access has been largely
successful, with certain exceptions. But in the decades following
the HEA, as more and more diverse Americans entered the higher
education sphere, there was a shift in thinking about higher
education.26 In the last fifty years, Congressional action can best
be understood through the lens of the investment imperative,27 a
perspective that understands higher education as a private, rather
than a public, good. Changes in funding and collection policies
have increasingly shifted the benefit, burden, and risk of higher
education from the public to the private student and her
household, regulating higher education “as though it were actually
a real commodity with a single purpose: generating return on
investment for the individual student in the form of higher
25. See Glater, supra note 4, at 1575–76; BETH AKERS & MATTHEW M. CHINGOS,
GAME OF LOANS: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF STUDENT DEBT 45 (2016) (“HEA had a
broad, lasting impact on higher education, including the creation of the first federal grant
program for college students . . . .”).
26. This Article does not argue that the shift in perspective was caused by increased
numbers of women and people of color entering higher education. Such an argument would
require a more in-depth study. There were likely multiple causes for the perspective shift,
including budget deficits fueled by the Vietnam War, an energy crisis in the late 1970s, and
the personal responsibility sentiment advanced by President Reagan’s economic policies.
See Camilla E. Watson, The Future of Lower-Income Students in Higher Education:
Rethinking the Pell Program and Federal Tax Incentives, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1107, 1109–
10, 1114, 1116–17 (2018); see also Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 129–30 (2003)
(“This shift in funding priorities was driven in part by an ideological shift during the
Reagan era. Higher education was presented as a private benefit to be financed by the
individual, instead of a public good to be funded by the government.” (footnotes omitted)).
27. The investment imperative is the cousin of the “education gospel” and the
“education is a commodity” metaphor. COTTOM, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining economist
W. Norton Grubb’s and historian Marvin Lazerson’s “education gospel” as “our faith in
education as moral, personally edifying, collectively beneficial, and a worthwhile
investment no matter the cost, either individual or societal”); Kraiem, supra note 11, at 690
(arguing that America has adopted an “education is a commodity” metaphor that offers
college as “an investment in [one’s] own human capital” and a “necessity” such that student
consumers “must shop around for the best return on investment”); see also Rachel E. Dwyer
et al., Youth Debt, Mastery, and Self-Esteem: Class-Stratified Effects of Indebtedness on
Self-Concept, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 727, 729 (2011) (citing studies that suggest that a college
degree is “an investment in human capital that is crucial to improving one’s life chances”).

57 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2019)

2019]

THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE

11

wages.”28 As detailed below, the last half-century of federal higher
education policymaking has largely maintained a commitment to
access initiatives, although without related institutional
accountability measures, and tied to more onerous terms and
punitive collection tools.
A. Early Legislative Push for Access
In the early days of the republic, the nation’s commitment to
education was in service of both individual advancement and
broader democratic values.29 In 1862 and 1890, Congress
maintained that sense with the passage of the Morrill Acts,
creating land-grant universities in the United States.30 Taken
together, the Morrill Acts were based on the principles that higher
education should be accessible and practical.31 Senator Justin
Smith Morrill argued that agriculture in the United States was
deteriorating and that “[i]mproving the skills and knowledge of
farmers was the best method to reverse this decline.”32 After
several failed attempts, Morrill convinced his colleagues that the
public good of education was equal to the value of the public lands
the government would give up to fund land-grant schools in every
state.33
More than half a century later, the Servicemen’s
Readjustment Act of 1944, commonly known as the G.I. Bill, once
again changed the higher education landscape.34 The G.I. Bill
offered returning World War II veterans a “year of full-time tuition
or training plus a period equal to their length of service up to forty-

28. Kraiem, supra note 11, at 690.
29. See Guinier, supra note 26, at 125–27 (describing Jefferson’s 1819 founding of the
University of Virginia and concluding that “the historical guiding principle of both public
and private universities has been to educate people who would then better serve society as
workers, citizens, and leaders”).
30. First Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 301–309 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)); Second Morrill Act, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417 (1890) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 321–328 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)); see also Staley, supra note 6
(detailing the First and Second Morrill Acts).
31. Staley, supra note 6.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 346, 58 Stat. 284; Charles R.
Jonas, Reemployment and Readjustment Rights of Veterans, 23 N.C. L. REV. 107, 115
(1945).

57 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2019)

12

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[57:1

eight months, along with subsistence pay for” all veterans and
male veterans’ dependents.35 President Roosevelt explained:
But after the war shall have been won, the best way that we
can repay a portion of that debt is to see to it, by planning
and by action now, that those men and women are
demobilized into an economy which is sound and prosperous,
with a minimum of unemployment and dislocation; and that,
with the assistance of Government, they are given the
opportunity to find a job for which they are fitted and
trained, in a field which offers some reasonable assurance of
well-being and continuous employment. For many, what
they desire most in the way of employment will require
special training and further education. . . . [T]he Nation is
morally obligated to provide this training and education and
the necessary financial assistance by which they can be
secured.36
The G.I. Bill was followed by the National Defense Education Act
of 1958, which endorsed funding, including student loans, for
science, math, engineering, and foreign language programs.37
Less than a decade later, Congress passed the Higher
Education Act of 1965.38 Its primary goal was to allow any student
who wanted postsecondary education to be able to access that
education.39 The HEA created a financial structure to allow more
students to pay for college by providing for grants, loans, and
work-study programs.40 It created a guaranteed student loan

35.
36.

COHEN, supra note 7, at 139.
Message to Congress on the Education of War Veterans, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/odgiced.html [https://per
ma.cc/7NF2-DMRS] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
37. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25,
at 46.
38. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
39. Id.; see also Glater, supra note 4, at 1575–76 (describing the primary goals of the
HEA).
40. Higher Education Act of 1965 §§ 201, 421, 441. The HEA has been reauthorized
and/or amended eight times, in 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008. Higher
Education Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-575, 82 Stat. 1014; Education Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235; Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94482, 90 Stat. 2081; Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367;
Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, 100 Stat. 1268; Higher
Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448; Higher Education
Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581; Higher Education Opportunity
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008).
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program,41 recognizing the dual public and private interest in
higher education:
I believe fully in the principle . . . that no boy or girl who can
benefit from a college education should be denied the
opportunity because of financial disability. When we pass
this bill we will be helping them, it is true, but we shall be
helping ourselves as a nation fully as much. Our young
people are our future, and the Nation a generation hence will
be dependent upon them. This is seed money, and the fruit it
bears will become apparent only later, when the student
generation now in our colleges has become the adult
leadership generation of the future.42
Early amendments supported the provision of grant dollars to
support the access initiative. Importantly, the 1972 amendments
gave us the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant, later renamed
the Pell Grant, which offered low-income students no-cost access
to higher education.43 The 1978 HEA amendments, known as the
Middle Income Student Assistance Act, expanded the grant
program to include middle-income students.44 Primarily beginning
with the Reagan Administration and as set forth below, Congress
continued the push for higher education access, but it was
maintained against the backdrop of the investment imperative.45
Congress continues to tinker with higher education policy. Today,
the 116th Congress is debating a major overhaul of the Higher
Education Act.46

41. The guaranteed loan program later became known as “Stafford Loans” and is
sometimes referred to as “Title IV funding” in reference to its location in the HEA. Augustus
F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, § 2601, 102 Stat. 130, 330.
42. 89 CONG. REC. 22,615 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hartke).
43. Education Amendments of 1972, sec. 131, § 401; see also Trio Programs, PELL
INST., http://www.pellinstitute.org/ed.shtml [https://perma.cc/96SM-93PM] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2019). The Pell Grant increased access to higher education to low-income students
by providing $1,200 annually to be used like a voucher at the student’s chosen college or
university. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 13. The 1972 amendments, however, also
opened up Title IV funding to proprietary (for-profit) institutions. Education Amendments
of 1972, sec. 102(a)(1), § 417B (including proprietary institutions in definition of “institution
of higher education”).
44. Middle Income Student Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
45. See infra Section II.C.
46. See Higher Education, EDUC. & LAB. COMMITTEE, https://edlabor.house.gov/issue
s/education/higher-education [https://perma.cc/4XAC-QY9G] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
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B. The Access Initiative Finds Great Success
For the most part, the government’s legislative push to
increase access to higher education has been successful, when
viewed both over time and in aggregate raw numbers.47
Approximately half of the fifteen million World War II
veterans enrolled in postsecondary education or training using
their G.I. benefits.48 Prior to 1940, only 10 percent of Americans
sought higher education; by 1948, that number grew by 50 percent
and continued to climb, with “vets [making up] half the
undergraduate population.”49 And the HEA has had a profound
effect on access to higher education.50 Between 1961 and 1969,
higher education enrollment increased by 93 percent.51 And, today,
the aggregate numbers are impressive. At last count, at least
twenty million American adults were enrolled in a degreegranting higher education program.52 Today, 63 percent of
Americans in their late twenties reported some college, compared
to 53 percent just two decades ago; those with a bachelor’s degree
increased from 24 percent to 34 percent.53
Access to higher education has increased across many
segments of the population and across various institutions. In the
wake of the civil rights and women’s rights movements, more
women and people of color entered higher education.54 In the
thirteen years between 1970 and 1983, undergraduate enrollment
47. The passage of federal legislation is not the only motivator for increased
participation in higher education. Key pieces of higher education legislation were passed
amidst the political and social backdrop of World War II, the civil rights movement, the
women’s rights movement, and an influx of immigration. One cannot separate the policy
from the political context. See GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 12–13 (“In the 1960s, when
federal financial aid policy was first formulated, the nation was in the midst of a period of
economic growth and security, declining poverty, and great social change. Women, African
Americans, immigrants, and working-class [W]hite people were all clamoring for a shot at
middle-class jobs and the American dream, and politicians in Washington wanted to
help. . . . Providing access to higher education was a clear and seemingly fair way to do
that.”); Guinier, supra note 26, at 127–28 (noting that legal challenges and social
movements of the 1950s and 1960s opened the door to higher education to previously
excluded students, including women and people of color).
48. COHEN, supra note 7, at 139–40 (“Of the more than 15 million eligible veterans,
about half took advantage of these educational benefits: 2.2 million attended college or postgraduate study, 3.5 million enrolled in other schooling, 1.4 million chose on-the-job training,
and 700,000 sought farm training.”).
49. Id. at 140.
50. Watson, supra note 26, at 1112–13.
51. Id. at 1113 n.29.
52. Fast Facts: Enrollment, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfact
s/display.asp?id=98 [https://perma.cc/DCK3-SXWU] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
53. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 40.
54. See Guinier, supra note 26, at 127–28.
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increased 47 percent, and rose another 18 percent by 1992.55 In the
decade between 2004–2005 and 2014–2015, the number of
bachelor’s degrees awarded to male students increased by 33
percent and to female students increased by 31 percent.56 During
that same time period, White students saw a 15 percent increase
in bachelor’s degrees, Black students saw a 42 percent increase,
Hispanic students saw a 115 percent increase, and Asian/Pacific
Islander students saw a 38 percent increase.57 The aggregate
number of degrees increased dramatically across all levels: the
number of associate’s degrees increased by 46 percent, the number
of bachelor’s degrees increased by 32 percent, the number of
master’s degrees increased by 31 percent, and the number of
doctorate degrees increased by 33 percent between 2004–2005 and
2014–2015.58
On average, higher education credentials translate into better
economic circumstances. Numerous studies, “using a variety of
methodologies[,] have consistently found that the economic
returns to college are positive and large.”59 One study from
Georgetown University’s Center on Education and the Workforce
found that workers with a bachelor’s degree earn almost one
million dollars more over the course of their lifetimes than workers
without a degree.60
The access initiative has not, however, been universally
successful or without concern. Many remain excluded from the
higher education system altogether.61 The G.I. Bill, for example,
55. Fast Facts: Enrollment, supra note 52.
56. SNYDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 9.
57. Id. Although racial minority groups saw gains during this period, the gains have
not achieved parity among racial groups in attaining bachelor’s degrees. “In 2014[–]15,
White students earned 67 percent of all bachelor’s degrees . . . , Black students earned 11
percent . . . , Hispanic students earned 12 percent . . . , and Asian/Pacific Islander students
earned about 7 percent.” Id.
58. Id.
59. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 69–70 (citing multiple studies); see also
Robert Kelchen, Student Loans: A Brief History, the Current Landscape, and Impacts on
Society, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND SOCIETY 173, 191 (Joseph L. DeVitis & Pietro A. Sasso
eds., 2016) (citing studies and concluding that “it is likely that the majority of students will
benefit from attending college even after taking student loan debt into account”).
60. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 69–70; see also John R. Brooks, IncomeDriven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher Education, 104 GEO. L.J. 229, 249
(2016) (citing economists who have concluded that “investing in higher education has
consistently been one of the best forms of investment around . . . .”). But see AKERS &
CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 70 (stating that while the studies consistently show that college
graduates earn more, on average, than those without college degrees, it is not necessarily
because their earnings skyrocket; rather, it is “driven in large part by the declining earnings
among workers without college degrees”).
61. See Brooks, supra note 60, at 238 (“[T]he data show that there is still a significant
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not only offered returning veterans access to higher education, it
also displaced women who would have otherwise accepted those
spots.62 And today, for students from low-income families, the data
show that college remains largely out of reach. Among those who
graduate from high school, only one in two children from families
in the bottom one-fifth of the income distribution enrolls in higher
education.63 And for those who do make it to college, their
experiences are varied and unequal.64 For those low-income
students who do enroll in higher education, data suggest that the
drop-out rate is 38 percent.65 And the disproportionate number of
Black and Hispanic students who come from low-income families
suggests that higher education remains limited for students from
those racial and ethnic backgrounds.66
C. With Great Access Comes Individual Responsibility
In the last fifty years, the investment imperative has emerged
as a touchstone of federal higher education policy. Driven by a
combination of increased numbers of Americans seeking access to
higher education, increased higher education costs, state
disinvestment, and a strong personal responsibility rhetoric,
Congress began treating higher education as a private, rather
than a public, good.
Although federal legislation is never an easy-to-plot line,67
this Section details four primary features of the recent higher
education landscape that reflect the strength of the investment
imperative. First, Congress continued access expansion by
extending loans to additional categories of people and allowing
individual borrowers to borrow more. Second, the loan expansion
occurred primarily through unsubsidized loans, which are less

barrier to higher education for students from low-income families . . . .”); Glater, supra note
4, at 1590 (explaining that the prospect of borrowing large amounts of money may deter
some students from applying to or enrolling in college).
62. COHEN, supra note 7, at 140.
63. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 72.
64. See infra Section IV.A.3 (discussing for-profit institutions).
65. HUELSMAN, supra note 17, at 15.
66. Research shows that nearly 40 percent of Black borrowers drop out, compared
with 29 percent of White borrowers. Id. at 15–16.
67. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 87 (“The history of federal student aid since its
inception has been a series of ebbs and flows, periods of generosity and periods of cuts, all
while college costs continued to rise. Support for helping economically vulnerable students
like ours secure a better future through higher education has been inconsistent, leaving
their opportunities subject to a volatile mix of politics and economics. In the midst of it all,
students are simply trying to get ahead.”).
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generous to borrowers than subsidized loans.68 Third, Congress
declined to connect access initiatives to institutional
accountability metrics, opening the door for the recent explosion of
for-profit colleges and universities. And fourth, at the same time
that Congress expanded the menu of education loans, it made it
more difficult for those borrowers who could not repay their loans.
While these features are arguably in contradiction with one
another, the investment imperative connects them all.69 Because
higher education is imperative, individuals will seek it out at all
costs. And investment in higher education’s “safe bet” justifies
both the punitive collection policies and the sluggish motivation
for government regulation.70
It is important to note that broad access to higher education
has remained a potent driving force in higher education
policymaking. In 2009, for example, Barack Obama told the
American people, “[T]onight, I ask every American to commit to at
least one year or more of higher education or career training. . . .
[W]hatever the training may be, every American will need to get
more than a high school diploma.”71
Yet, the financing of that access has increasingly been offered
through loans, rather than grants. The greatest increase has come
in the form of unsubsidized loans, which have higher interest rates
than subsidized loans and accrue interest from the disbursement
of the loan, even when the student is enrolled in school. In 1968,
Congress raised the interest rate in an effort to “tighten up [the
HEA] program” by offering loans that “will not provide for an
68. Unsubsidized loans may carry a higher interest rate than subsidized loans and
begin to accrue interest as soon as they are disbursed. Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans,
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized [htt
ps://perma.cc/S4S4-TXYA] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). In contrast, students do not pay
interest on subsidized loans while engaged in at least half-time education and during a
short grace period after graduation. Id.
69. Other scholars have used different lenses through which to view the legislature’s
shift from viewing higher education as a public good to viewing it as a private good. See,
e.g., Camilla E. Watson, Reforming the Tax Incentives for Higher Education, 36 VA. TAX
REV. 83 (2017) (arguing that politics, a changing economy, and a congressional enmity to
students has driven the legislative policy shift on higher education). This can be read in
conjunction with the investment imperative.
70. WALTER W. MCMAHON, TIAA-CREF INST., THE PRIVATE AND SOCIAL BENEFITS OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 2, 7 (2010), https://www.tiaainstitute.org/sites/default/files/presentat
ions/2017-02/ahe_privatesocial0310c.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ4H-6USZ] (stating that
lawmakers are unlikely to conclude that there is a need for greater governmental
intervention to make college more available without an understanding of the widespread
public benefits of higher education).
71. President Barack Obama, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009)
(transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-pre
sident-barack-obama-address-joint-session-congress [https://perma.cc/YQ5L-AFDM]).
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interest subsidy during the repayment period.”72 As Congress
decreased grant amounts and increased access to unsubsidized
loans, by 1981, loan dollars topped grant dollars as the prevailing
form of federal aid.73 The Student Financial Assistance Technical
Amendments Act of 1982 restricted the Pell Grant award and
“revised the need-based criteria for [supplemental educational
opportunity grants], work-study grants, and direct loans.”74 The
1992 HEA amendments then created an unsubsidized federal loan
portfolio, increased loan limits, and eliminated borrowing limits
on Parent PLUS loans.75 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 cut
$12.7 billion from higher education financial aid.76 At the same
time, Congress added another category of loans—Graduate PLUS
loans, which allowed individuals to take on additional
unsubsidized federal loans at a higher interest rate for graduate
studies.77
As Congress expanded access to (mostly unsubsidized)
education loans, it failed to tie those federal dollars to
accountability measures for the beneficiary postsecondary
institutions.78 While institutions must meet certain requirements
to maintain access to federal loan dollars, including accreditation
by an agency recognized by the Department of Education,79 such
72. 90 CONG. REC. 23,111 (1968) (statement of Rep. Meeds) (explaining the purpose
was to “increase the volume of loans”).
73. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 48–49, 49 fig.3.4. This does not account for
scholarships provided by institutions and private sources.
74. Student Financial Assistance Technical Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97301, 96 Stat. 1400; Watson, supra note 26, at 1117. But see id. (discussing the 1986 HEA
amendments, which increased the Pell Grant award and extended the Perkins Loan for the
lowest-income students, among implementing other changes).
75. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 47. Parent PLUS loans refer to a loan
program for parents of undergraduates, which was first created in 1980. Id. at 22. These
legislative choices were made, at least in part, to counter a sense that HEA programs had
“literally spun out of control.” 102 CONG. REC. 6846 (1992) (statement of Rep. Gordon).
76. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006); Watson,
supra note 26, at 1124.
77. Deficit Reduction Act, sec. 8005(c), § 428(b). Then, in 2010, Congress passed the
Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (“SAFRA”), which acted to make the federal
government, through the Department of Education, the primary direct lender of education
debt and changed and expanded income-based repayment options. See Brooks, supra note
24, at 851–53.
78. See GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 16–17 (discussing how federal student aid
flows to colleges and universities without any concomitant requirement that the colleges
and universities commit to affordability or quality); Kraiem, supra note 11, at 691 (noting
that the HEA has been “entirely ineffective in terms of protecting both public and private
investment in higher education”).
79. ALEXANDRA HEGJI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43826, AN OVERVIEW OF
ACCREDITATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R43826.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DZ4-Y6CB].
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metrics provide little real accountability. Accreditation, which can
be governed by regional, national, or programmatic accrediting
agencies, is a poor marker of institutional quality because it does
not account for graduation rates, retention rates, job placement
rates, or student performance in skills assessments.80 And
although institutions can lose access to federal financial aid
dollars if their graduates’ default rates are exceedingly high,81
default rates do not adequately measure students’ ability to repay
or the quality of the education received, in part because the
calculation of default rates ignores long-term ability to repay and
can be easily manipulated.82 Inadequate accountability measures
account for one significant cause of the recent proliferation of forprofit colleges and universities. A recent push for deregulation of
the higher education industry projects a future of further qualitycontrol slippage.83 The recent move by Education Secretary Betsy
DeVos to formally rescind the “gainful employment rule”84 that
was enacted by the Obama Administration to hold to account the
for-profit-college industry, for example, will limit the pressure on
those institutions to prove the value of their programs through
student outcome metrics.85
Finally, we see Congress’s institution of a series of punitive
collection policies. Before 1978, for example, student loan debts

80. Id. at 2–4, 17.
81. Kelchen, supra note 59, at 189 (explaining that colleges can lose access to
financial aid if their three-year cohort default rate exceeds 40% in the most recent year or
more than 30% in three consecutive years).
82. See id. (arguing that the default statistics are an imperfect measure because they
only include the first three years of repayment, which ignores long-term outcomes, and
because students might be in income-driven repayment plans that allow a student to pay
little or no money on her loan without going into default); Andrew Kreighbaum, GAO:
Colleges, Consultants Game Rules to Lower Default Rates, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 27,
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/27/gao-finds-colleges-manipulatingloan-default-rates-keep-access-federal-aid [https://perma.cc/KH7L-TL3T] (citing U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-163, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: ACTIONS NEEDED
TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF SCHOOLS’ DEFAULT RATES (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets
/700/691520.pdf [https://perma.cc/EGV6-L6XY], which details how some colleges were
“gaming” the cohort default statistics by pushing graduates into forbearance to lower the
institutions’ default statistics).
83. See Eric Kelderman, Era of Deregulation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 4, 2018),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/DeVos-Has-Nixed-Several/242664 [https://perma.cc/J5A
V-NDNL] (tracking Betsy DeVos’s deregulation activities in her first year as Secretary of
the Department of Education).
84. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 84 Fed. Reg. 31,392 (July 1, 2019) (to
be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 600, 668).
85. Andrew Kreighbaum, DeVos Issues Final Repeal of Gainful Employment, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (July 2, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/07/02
/devos-issues-final-repeal-gainful-employment [https://perma.cc/JX6Z-6H7P].
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were dischargeable in bankruptcy like other unsecured credit.86 In
1978, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to limit the
discharge of education debt in the first five years only to a debtor
establishing “undue hardship.”87 Representative Thornton, in
1976, explained the rationale: “The discharge in bankruptcy of
student loans is an important contributing factor to the feelings of
dissatisfaction and frustration about these programs, and many
people are alarmed about the possibility of increasing numbers of
students taking advantage of the escape hatch provided by the
Bankruptcy law.”88 Other lawmakers pointed to the integrity of
the student loan program, arguing that allowing debtors to
discharge their education loans in bankruptcy will limit the
education loans that can be made to future students.89
Congress continued to make discharging education debt in
bankruptcy more difficult by extending the exemption to seven
years in 1990, extending the exemption to the life of the debt in
1998,90 and, finally, extending the exemption to all education
loans, including private loans, in 2005.91 Not only did Congress
eliminate a debtor’s option to use the consumer bankruptcy system
to discharge education debt,92 Congress simultaneously instituted
a number of punitive collection tools for outstanding federal
student debt.93 The 1992 HEA Amendments removed the statute

86. Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan
Debt, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 363 (2013).
87. Id.
88. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm.
on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1066 (1976)
(statement of Rep. Thornton).
89. See, e.g., 95 CONG. REC. 1792 (1978) (statement of Rep. Ertel).
90. Frank T. Bayuk, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans Under
11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue Hardship Exception,
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2004).
91. The change was made through the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). Alexei Alexandrov & Dalié Jiménez, Lessons from
Bankruptcy Reform in the Private Student Loan Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 178
(2017) (exploring the stated rationale for BAPCPA—that increased creditor rights would
translate to lower interest rates and greater access for students).
92. For a full exploration of Congress’s treatment of student debtors under the
Bankruptcy Code, see Austin, supra note 86, at 410 (“By making education debt
nondischargeable, Congress has linked student loan default together with offenses such as
fraud, willful injury, and failure to pay child support.”).
93. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary
Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 565 (2002) (“When the government itself is the
unsecured creditor, the legal system provides particularly potent assistance. The
government has unique collection tools (such as imposing tax liens), and continuously
searches for new methods of getting now-impecunious borrowers to pay taxes or to honor
other government obligations.”).
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of limitations for federal collections.94 Then, with the passage of
the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Congress gave the
federal government unfettered rights to collect from student
borrowers by “removing any federal or state statutory, regulatory,
or administrative limitation on loan collections and authorizing
the garnishment of wages and Social Security benefits.”95
D. Increased Access Supported by the Investment Imperative
Comes at a Cost
As the investment imperative took hold in federal
policymaking, college costs were also rising at unprecedented
rates. That means that the spending power of the Pell Grant and
other scholarships declined. Therefore, students turned more and
more to credit to finance their higher education. With the
combination of federal policy aimed at increasing access to loan
dollars, rising costs of education, and fewer state dollars covering
those costs, it is no wonder that aggregate student education debt
has exploded in the last fifty years.
Over the last fifty years, higher education has become much
more expensive. Between the 1970s and mid-2010s, tuition and
fees at higher education institutions greatly outpaced inflation;
researchers have found that between 1971–1972 and 2014–2015,
tuition and fees outpaced inflation by 191 percent at private fouryear colleges, by 198 percent at public two-year colleges, and by
265 percent at public four-year colleges.96 Adjusted for inflation,
the average annual net price for a public four-year college has
increased by approximately $2,100 since 1990; the annual cost for
a private four-year college has increased by approximately $3,500
in the same time.97 For traditionally low-cost public institutions,
that dollar increase represents a 111 percent increase in the last
three decades.98 The cost increase can be traced to a number of
94. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 1551, 106 Stat.
448, 838.
95. C. Aaron LeMay & Robert C. Cloud, Student Debt and the Future of Higher
Education, 34 J.C. & U.L. 79, 82 (2007); see e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1091a (2012) (allowing debt
collection to be occur without regard to any state, local, or federal statute of limitations).
96. Kelchen, supra note 59, at 173 (citing SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, TRENDS IN
COLLEGE PRICING 3, 10 (The College Board ed., 2014)). While students may not necessarily
pay the list price for their education due to scholarships and tuition remission, in just the
fifteen years between 1995–1996 and 2011–2012 acdemic years, the median net price
students paid increased by almost 24 percent, after adjusting for inflation. Id. at 174.
97. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 50–51.
98. Id. at 51; see also GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 39 (noting that, in the last
generation, public colleges and universities have seen their state budget allocations
slashed; on average, those institutions have seen a decline in state dollars from 75 percent
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factors, including state disinvestment in higher education,
increased demand for higher education, and increased costs of
services provided at institutions of higher education.99 Without
sufficient state financial support, and in the face of increased
demand and increased costs, institutions have passed the costs on
to individual students and their families. Those families are
increasingly turning to debt to finance higher education.100 In a
2017 study, students aged 18 to 24 and their families reported that
they borrowed to pay for 27 percent of higher education, up from
only 20 percent just one year prior.101 Today, after accounting for
grant dollars, three-fourths of students’ families pay more than 20
percent of their annual income toward higher education and lowof operating budget to 50 percent of operating budget).
99. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 56–57. The reason why college costs have
risen so dramatically is the subject of some scholarly debate. Cf. id. at 54–60; DANIEL D.
POLSBY, UNDERSTANDING THE RUNAWAY TUITION PHENOMENON: CREDENCE GOODS IN AN
AGE OF SKEPTICISM (2017), https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_pa
pers/1710.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC37-SDR4]. Polsby argues that the Bennett hypothesis is
the only legitimate explanation for the rise in college tuition. The Bennett hypothesis,
named for former Secretary of Education William Bennett, posits that tuition increases are
directly linked to federal government subsidies for higher education. In other words, the
more grant and loan dollars that the government makes available, the more schools will
charge. Id. at 4–5. Robert Kelchen, on the other hand, argues that, when one runs the
numbers, there is less evidence to support the Bennett hypothesis than one might think, at
least in professional education programs. See Robert Kelchen, Does the Bennett Hypothesis
Hold in Professional Education? An Empirical Analysis, RES. HIGHER EDUC. 1, https://link.s
pringer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11162-019-09557-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B8V-SSH
7] (finding “little consistent evidence to support the Bennett [h]ypothesis” in either business
or medical school); Robert Kelchen, Is There Evidence of the Bennett Hypothesis in Legal
Education?, ROBERT KELCHEN (Nov. 8, 2017), https://robertkelchen.com/2017/11/08/benn
ett-hypothesis-legal-education/ [https://perma.cc/M52H-7R34]. This Article does not
generally weigh in on the supply side of the increased costs of higher education, which
would require an interrogation of the Bennett hypothesis and other explanations for rising
tuition costs. Rather, it is focused on the demand side of the equation, exploring whether
and how the investment imperative distorts consumer decision-making with respect to
attending and financing higher education. It does recognize, however, that there is a
relationship between the supply side of education, the investment imperative, and
consumers’ decision-making. To the extent that rising tuition costs do not translate to better
economic (or noneconomic) outcomes, there is an increased cost for a decreased value. We
see this, without question, in the for-profit industry. See infra notes 227–31 and
accompanying text (discussing the allegations of ineffective educational services with
regard to for-profit colleges). To take that a step further, such a disconnect is deeply
connected to and distorted by the near mythological belief in higher education as a
necessary investment. To the extent that the cultural belief in the investment imperative
is outdated, its continued hold on prospective students exacerbates the distortions
identified in Part IV and opens vulnerable students to further exploitation.
100. See GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that state disinvestment in public
higher education “fueled the declining purchasing power of the Pell [Grant] and the need
for so many middle-class families to turn to student loans”); Glater, supra note 4, at 1577–
78 (tracing the increase in student borrowing to a combination of grant aid that has lagged
behind need, stagnated household incomes, and increased tuition).
101. SALLIE MAE, supra note 12, at 2, 12.
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income families making less than $16,000 per year pay 84 percent
of their income to support their children’s higher education.102 For
the 39 percent of undergraduates who receive a Pell Grant,103 the
great majority find the grant insufficient to meet the high cost of
higher education; today, 90 percent of Pell Grant recipients
graduate with debt.104 Debt-to-income ratios reflect the class
disparities; “low-income families hold student debt amounting to
about 70 percent of their income, while wealthier families have
student debt amounting to around 10 percent of income (a rate
deemed manageable by the financial industry).”105
In the 1980s, annual student borrowing increased five-fold
from a decade prior, to approximately $22 billion in present-day
dollars.106 And by the mid-2010s, annual borrowing increased fivefold again, to more than $100 billion.107 In the last twenty years,
U.S. households aged 20 to 40 have witnessed an almost two-fold
increase in education debt, from 20 to 38 percent.108 Looking just
at those households with debt, the average outstanding debt has
risen from $8,300 to $21,000.109 Today, aggregate student debt is
closing in on $1.5 trillion, more than double its count a decade
prior.110 The most recent official data show that 36 percent of
undergraduate students received federal loans in 2015–2016, with
31 percent taking subsidized loans and 30 percent saddled with
unsubsidized loans.111 Education debt has long-term effects on
borrowers’ financial well-being; a 2013 report found that a
household with student debt stands to lose $208,000 over a
lifetime relative to a household without debt.112
As costs have risen and increasingly been borne by individual
students and their families, the levels of default have also risen.
102. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 5.
103. RADWIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 5.
104. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 5, 17 (noting that the “maximum Pell [Grant]
covers less than one-third of the cost of attending a public four-year college or university
and barely 60 percent of the cost of attending a community college”).
105. Id. at 94.
106. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 1.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 40.
109. Id.
110. RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 13, at 3.
111. RADWIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 5. This is an increase from 26 percent of
undergraduates who borrowed to pay for college in the 1995–1996 academic year. Kelchen,
supra note 59, at 181.
112. ROBERT HILTONSMITH, AT WHAT COST? HOW STUDENT DEBT REDUCES LIFETIME
WEALTH 9 (2013), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/AtWhatCost.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D289-NAZ4] (concluding the discrepancy is largely due to retirement
savings).
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The current rate of default on federal loans is 10 percent—
“representing 475,000 students in a single cohort who defaulted
within only two years of entering repayment . . . .”113 Although
many borrowers are able to manage their student debt, there is
consensus that certain communities and borrowers are especially
vulnerable to default. The greatest risk for defaulting on a loan is
failure to obtain a degree.114 Further, unmanageable student debt
“clusters at” certain variables, including low-dollar loans, forprofit student borrowers, low-income borrowers, female borrowers,
Black borrowers, and borrowers with dependent family members
(parents or children).115 Older borrowers are also at risk; almost
“40 percent of federal student loan borrowers aged 65 and older
are in default” on their loans.116
For students attending for-profit institutions, an area of rapid
growth in the 1990s and 2000s, the statistics are particularly grim.
By 2009, the default rate for students attending for-profit colleges
had reached 47 percent.117 For example, in a study of New York
postsecondary institutions, the Century Foundation found: (1) a
majority of students at 38 percent of for-profit schools left school
“with earnings below those of an average worker with only a high
school diploma,” and (2) almost half of for-profit students defaulted
on their federal loans within twelve years, which is more than four
times the rate of their peers.118 The most recent data, which
113. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 101 (calling the default rate a “national
tragedy”). A “cohort default rate measures the percentage of students who borrowed, left
college in a given year, and defaulted on their loans within a given period of time.” Kelchen,
supra note 59, at 188. For federal loans, a default occurs after nonpayment for 270 days.
Many more student borrowers are delinquent on their loans, meaning that they have failed
to repay for some period less than nine months. For example, in 2014, of the nearly 350
billion federal dollars that should be in repayment (excluding those in deferment and
forbearance), only 72 percent of the dollars was in on-time repayment; “$40.6 billion [was]
delinquent between 31 and 180 days, $14 billion [was] delinquent more than 180 days, and
. . . $40.1 billion [was] in default.” Id.
114. See Kelchen, supra note 59, at 189–90 (noting that in the 2003–2004 school year,
those who failed to complete a degree were responsible for more than 60 percent of the
defaults by 2009).
115. Kraiem, supra note 11, at 699–700.
116. PERSIS YU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PUSHED INTO POVERTY: HOW STUDENT
LOAN COLLECTIONS THREATEN THE FINANCIAL SECURITY OF OLDER AMERICANS 3 (2017),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/student_loans/student-loan-collections-threaten-fin-sec.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BZ7C-CSNY].
117. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 102–03 (describing the statistics for students
five years into repayment).
118. CAO, supra note 21, at 3. Those data are not unique; for-profit institutions have
come under fire from Congress and advocates for failing their students and engaging in
widespread schemes of misrepresentation and fraud. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH,
EDUC., LABOR AND PENSIONS, FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO
SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS (2012), https://
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provide more of a long-term view, suggest that more than half of
for-profit college students default on their loans.119
For those borrowers in default, they face yet another huge
cost—the punitive collection policies instituted by Congress to
collect on federal debt. In addition to facing no statute of
limitations on collection,120 the federal government can rely on a
host of punitive collection tools that include administrative wage
garnishment, tax return seizure, Social Security offsets, and
diminished Earned Income Tax Credits, among others.121 Many
states are also policing default at the behest of the federal
government; nineteen states allow for professional licenses to be
revoked and one revokes driver’s licenses for debtors who default
on education loans.122 Borrowers are also subject to the costs and
fees of collection, which are added to the principal of their loan.123
And, as discussed above, with rare exception, a debtor’s education
loans cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.124 Higher education
policymaking has written the investment imperative—through its
preoccupation with access and treatment of higher education as a
private good—into the law. The next Part will investigate how that
has affected consumers.125

www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI-PartIII-SelectedAppendixes.pdf [h
ttps://perma.cc/FAL6-QG2V]. For a full understanding of the failures of for-profit colleges,
see id. and COTTOM, supra note 2.
119. Judith Scott-Clayton, The Looming Student Loan Default Crisis Is Worse than We
Thought, BROOKINGS (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-looming-stu
dent-loan-default-crisis-is-worse-than-we-thought/ [https://perma.cc/T8KQ-5J8N].
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a (2012); see LeMay & Cloud, supra note 95, at 87.
121. For a full explanation of the administrative collection procedures for student debt,
see Austin, supra note 86, at 406–07; Doug Rendleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of
Student Loans: A Critical Examination, 20 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 215, 243–53
(2014).
122. Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., When Unpaid Student Loan Bills Mean You Can
No Longer Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/business
/student-loans-licenses.html [https://perma.cc/DE5N-FEBT].
123. Collections, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/default/c
ollections#other-costs [https://perma.cc/7SRJ-NQ4E] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
124. See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.
125. I recognize that even the use of the term “consumer” in this context might be
considered an endorsement of the commodification of higher education. See supra notes 27–
28 and accompanying text. Perhaps a better term would be “student” or even “citizen.” See,
e.g., D. Carolina Núñez, Mapping Citizenship: Status, Membership, and the Path in
Between, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 477, 481 (recognizing that legal scholars have put a lot of stock
in the concept of citizenship as a means of conceptualizing rights, participation, work,
standing, and identity). I use consumer in this context, however, because: (1) it is the
primary language used by higher education financing scholars; and (2) I believe that the
consumer protection framework doctrine offers a framework that might stem the tide of
exploitative financing practices.
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III. THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE EFFECT
Not only does the investment imperative bubble up in higher
education policy, it also drives and distorts individual decisionmaking about postsecondary education. One industry study
reported that nearly 100 percent of respondents, over ten years,
noted that the primary driving force for college attendance is the
notion that “[c]ollege is an investment in the student’s future.”126
It also found that “[c]lose to [nine] in [ten] families said they knew
the student would attend college as early as his or her enrollment
in preschool.”127 It reported, however, that only about four in ten
families had a plan to pay for college, with fewer families confident
about that plan over time.128 Individual stories from original
qualitative research provide an additional layer of support and
insight as to those findings. The great majority of the sixty-five
borrowers interviewed explicitly discussed either: (1) a sense that
college was the natural or assumed next step, without articulating
individual rationales for college attendance; (2) a belief that
college was an economic investment in their future; or (3) both.129
That commitment to higher education, however, was not
necessarily connected to a plan for financing the college
investment. Rather, the majority of respondents borrowed
indiscriminately against their future, putting faith in the promise
of the investment imperative. This Part explores how the
investment imperative affects students’ decision-making about
attending and financing their postsecondary education.
A. Methodology
“Qualitative research ‘is a broad umbrella term for research
methodologies that describe and explain persons’ experiences,
behavi[or]s, interactions and social contexts’ without relying on
quantitative or statistical models.”130 By engaging intimately with
individuals directly affected by laws, policies, and systems,
qualitative work adds context and nuance to quantitative
research.131 It fills in gaps in previous research and opens up new
126. See SALLIE MAE, supra note 12, at 5.
127. Id. at 6.
128. Id. at 28.
129. See discussion infra Section III.B.
130. Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J.
435, 458 (2013) (quoting Ellie Fossey et al., Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative
Research, 36 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 717, 717 (2002)).
131. Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 DUKE L.J. 233, 242 (2017)
(“[W]hat we can glean only by engaging in in-depth interviews with those directly affected
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questions for future research.132 Because the goal of qualitative
work is to garner in-depth information from a smaller group of
people, it “makes no claim of the generalizability of findings to a
specified larger population in a probabilistic sense.”133
Accordingly, qualitative analysis in this Article does not generally
quantify data, but uses terms such as “most,” “many,” and similar
adjectives.134 Legal scholars frequently rely on qualitative data to
investigate the effects of the legal system on individual people.135
This Article utilizes the data from an original qualitative
research study in which I am a co-investigator.136 Over the course
of ten months (from August 2017 to May 2018), two researchers at
the UNC Center for Community Capital interviewed individuals
who used loans to finance some or all of their higher education.137
I set out the basic outlines of the sample below. For a more detailed

by the legal rules, systems, and processes we study: an understanding of how, in their
actual social contexts, these actors experience, understand, and internalize the relevant
legal rules and structures, and how these structures become sources of personal meaning
and determinants of behavior.”).
132. Id. at 242, 265–66 (“The aim of the study and sampling strategy is to illuminate
and understand rather than to predict or determine causation. This is the dominant
strategy used among analytical sociologists.”).
133. Sousa, supra note 130, at 458 (quoting Fossey et al., supra note 130, at 730).
134. This is consistent with accepted qualitative analysis methods. See Greene, supra
note 131, at 266.
135. See, e.g., Foohey, supra note 23, at 1345 (using a qualitative study of religious
organizations that filed chapter 11 bankruptcy to understand whether and how the leaders
conceptualized their financial problems as legal problems solvable through legal
reorganization); Greene, supra note 131, at 242, 267–68 (using qualitative data to provide
insight into the experiences of recipients of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) program); Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned
Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515 (2013) (using
a qualitative study to test the benefits and drawbacks of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) as a poverty-reduction program); Sousa, supra note 130, at 461 (using qualitative
data to better understand the relationship between bankruptcy, shame, and stigma); see
also Greene, supra, at 521 n.32 (cataloguing “important studies in legal scholarship [that]
have been conducted using qualitative methods”).
136. I was not involved in the sampling or interviewing, but was involved in modifying
the interview guide, topic monitoring, and analysis.
137. “The [UNC] Center for Community Capital is a non-partisan, multi-disciplinary
research center housed within the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a
leading center for research and policy analysis on the power of financial capital to transform
households and communities in the United States.” Our Organization, CTR. FOR
COMMUNITY CAP., https://communitycapital.unc.edu/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/Q2KJ-XYZ
F] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). The interviews were undertaken with the approval and
guidance of the University of North Carolina Institutional Review Board. All 65 interviews
were conducted by Jess Dorrance and/or Julia Barnard, two researchers who were then
employed by the UNC Center for Community Capital. For a complete explanation of the
methods employed, see DAVID ANSONG ET AL., UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, RESEARCH ON
THE IMPACT OF STUDENT LOAN DEBT ON HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL HEALTH:
METHODOLOGICAL & TECHNICAL APPENDIX 4–5 (2019).
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breakdown of the sample and a comparison of the sample
characteristics to the nationally-representative sample of
undergraduates and graduates contained in the National PostSecondary Aid Study, please see the Methodological and Technical
Appendix for the underlying study.138 The researchers employed a
semi-structured interview approach, using an interview guide on
a range of issues, asking about each respondent’s experience
deciding whether and where to attend college and how to finance
that decision, the respondent’s financial and social experiences in
college, and the respondent’s financial and social experiences after
college. The researchers surveyed and interviewed 65 people
ranging in age from 19 to 58, with an average age of approximately
31. They spoke with 32 men and 33 women currently living in
Austin, Texas; Bryan/College Station, Texas; Chicago, Illinois;
Durham/Raleigh, North Carolina; Houston, Texas; Kansas City,
Kansas; Lawrence, Kansas; Los Angeles, California; New York
City, New York; and San Antonio, Texas.139 Interviews ranged
from approximately thirty to seventy-five minutes. Each
respondent received a $35.00 Target gift card.140 To recruit
respondents, the researchers “used a combination of three
nonprobability sampling strategies[—]convenience, maximum
variation, and snowball sampling,” supplemented by consecutive
sampling in some locations.141 With the participants’ consent, the
researchers audio-recorded and transcribed the interviews. The
researchers also interviewed a number of “key informant” experts;
those interviews provided context for the analysis.
After consulting with the researchers to generate a list of
relevant topics and discuss research questions, I reviewed the
transcripts for discussion related to the identified topics, using a
structural coding technique142 via a qualitative data analysis
software program called Atlas.ti. Such topic monitoring allowed
me to examine general themes and patterns across the
transcripts.143
138. See ANSONG ET AL., supra note 137, at 11.
139. The sample is not a representative sample, as compared to the general population
or to the primary federal higher education data collection, the National Post-Secondary Aid
Study (NPSAS). As relative to NPSAS, the sample used herein is overrepresented by
borrowers of color, men, borrowers who have sought higher education beyond an associate’s
degree, and first generation students. See id. at 6–7, 11.
140. This compensation is consistent with standard social-science research protocols.
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 131, at 265.
141. See ANSONG ET AL., supra note 137, at 4.
142. JOHNNY SALDAÑA, THE CODING MANUAL FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCHERS 98–99
(3d ed. 2016).
143. Id.; see also Greene, supra note 131, at 266 (describing a similar process); Sousa,
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While I consulted with the researchers throughout the
interviews and to develop the interview guide, the interview guide
was not designed to test any of the theories this Article advances.
Rather, the insights that arose out of the interviews, when viewed
alongside other data and scholarship, provided support for the
investment imperative theory developed herein.144 Consistent
with basic tenets of social science research, pseudonyms have been
used to protect the confidentiality of the respondents.145
By paying attention to individual student borrower’s
experiences, we can understand how higher education laws and
policies interact with social context and real lives. While the
theories advanced in this Article do not rely on the sample alone,
the data from the sample provide information and insight to
complement, corroborate, and complicate the theories. Because
our sample is small and (purposely) diverse, it is hard to draw
conclusions specific to certain subsections of the population. Much
more work should be done in this area to better understand how
certain population groups experience higher education and
student debt in different ways. What is interesting and valuable
about this study is that certain themes arose across the varied
sample. Those themes, when placed in the context of other
qualitative and quantitative studies and scholarly works, suggest
that (1) the investment imperative is a widely-held construct; (2)
the investment imperative drives college attendance; and (3) the
investment imperative distorts students’ decision-making about
higher education in interesting, and problematic, ways. The
remainder of the Article delves into more detail on these themes.
B. The Investment Imperative Buy-In
For the great majority of the students interviewed, college
matriculation was assumed. The desire to go to college was
ingrained in them and they were unable to articulate when or why
they chose to pursue a college education. This theme arose across
family income, cultural background, and parental educational
attainment. Respondents noted that college was “non-

supra note 130, at 463 (describing a similar process).
144. But see Foohey, supra note 23, at 1334, 1340 (using qualitative interviews to test
a hypothesis that arose from quantitative findings).
145. See Sousa, supra note 130, at 463.
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negotiable,”146 “assumed,”147 “presumed,”148 “an expectation,”149
and “just generally what you did.”150 Several respondents
explicitly recognized that college attendance was never a choice.151
In other words, little individual thought centered on whether to
pursue higher education. This is the imperative part of the
investment imperative. When something is unavoidable or
required, it is imperative. It is done without additional
consideration because it is necessary.
Upon further investigation, many respondents connected
their assumptions about college attendance to messaging they got
from their families, high schools, or communities.152 The source of
this messaging did differ somewhat across groups. For some, prep
or high schools led them to higher education: “I think it was
always, like in high school I was always in college prep courses or
honors courses, so it was never a question about whether or not I
would go to college.”153 For many, family and friends
communicated that college was the only option. Respondents
whose parents and grandparents sought higher education made
such pronouncements: “I was raised in an environment where
college was always the expectation, and higher ed was always the
goal. My parents said that to me quite often, and that was just part
of my mom’s mantras for her kids.”154 Claudio recalled, “My
grandmother went to college[,] so I was going to college. I mean, I

146. Interview with Illinois Borrower One (Jan. 17, 2018).
147. Interview with Kansas Borrower Five (Aug. 30, 2017); see also Interview with
Texas Borrower Four (Feb. 17, 2018).
148. Interview with Illinois Borrower Nine (Jan. 20, 2018).
149. Interview with Kansas Borrower Two (Aug. 30, 2017).
150. Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018).
151. See, e.g., Interview with California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018) (“Not going to
[college] was just not something I ever thought of.”); Interview with California Borrower
Six (Apr. 14, 2018) (going to college “just was never a second thought”); Interview with
Texas Borrower Two (Feb. 17, 2018) (the decision to attend college “wasn’t really a choice”);
Interview with Texas Borrower Nine (Feb. 18, 2019) (“My parents never really made it an
option . . . .”).
152. See COTTOM, supra note 2, at 128 (referencing sociologist Anne Mullen’s work
with Ivy League students, who could not describe how or why they decided to attend college
and could not separate their own college aspirations from their parent’s expectations).
153. Interview with New York Borrower Six (Oct. 17, 2017).
154. Interview with Texas Borrower Five (Feb. 17, 2018); see also Interview with
California Borrower Nine (Apr. 15, 2018) (“[I]n the community that I grew up in, it was
kind of expected. It was really rare for people not to go to college. So it’s just kind of like an
expectation.”); Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I grew up in
northern Virginia, which is pretty well-off suburbs. A lot of successful people, work for the
government, other businesses. So, it was already around that, people went to college. And
that’s just generally what you did.”).
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guess I never thought about not going to college.”155 Firstgeneration college students received similar messaging from their
parents. Savi explained:
There wasn’t even, like, a question as to whether we were
gonna go. Like, we had to. You know, I never even know [sic]
there were other options other than going to a four-year
school. So, I mean, even though neither one of my parents
graduated from college they really stressed that we had to go
to college.156
Cheryl recalled, “I don’t think college was ever . . . [t]here was ever
a question that I wouldn’t go. I mean my parents never went so
they definitely pushed it where it was never not an option.”157 And
Robert recalled, “I’m the first[-]generation college student in my
family, so my dad always came up to me and was like, ‘Oh, you’re
going to go to college, right?’ I didn’t even know what that was.”158
And for students with immigrant parents, the investment
messaging around higher education was particularly strong.159
The imperative is justified by the sense of economic
investment. Sociologist Sara Goldrick-Rab, after significant
quantitative and qualitative work in higher education, has
concluded: “Higher education is no longer seen as a choice or a
luxury—it is viewed as the only available next step and, indeed,
the only hope.”160 Our respondents agreed. Upon reflection about
their college decisions, many respondents connected their college
goals to an expected financial result.161 Respondents discussed
155. Interview with California Borrower One (Apr. 13, 2018).
156. Interview with Kansas Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017). Scholars agree that,
especially for low-income students, “getting ahead in life is a main reason for attending
college.” GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 166.
157. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017).
158. Interview with New York Borrower Three (Oct. 16, 2017).
159. See, e.g., Interview with New York Borrower Five (Oct. 16, 2017) (“[I]t was a
theme that my parents had. They’re from the Dominican Republic, so they just felt like
school, college, was the way to be a qualified candidate to do jobs that they deemed just
admirable: teacher, nurse, doctor, whatever the case may be.”); see also Interview with New
York Borrower Four (Oct. 16, 2017); Interview with North Carolina Borrower Three (Sept.
3, 2017).
160. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 19.
161. See, e.g., Interview with Kansas Borrower Eight (Sept. 1, 2017) (“I think that I
would tell somebody coming out of high school that the debt that you accrue in
undergraduate degree is gonna be insignificant in comparison to the . . . value that you get
from having a degree.”). Of course, financial investment was not the only reason why our
respondents wanted to attend college. See, e.g., Interview with California Borrower Eight
(Apr. 15, 2018) (“I knew that the only way out was college.”); Interview with Illinois
Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018) (“I started kind of thinking about the possibility of just using
college as a way to get out of . . . a very small town in North Carolina.”); Interview with
Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017) (discussing his “crazy, crazy family” and that “college
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college as a means of making money,162 gaining skills that would
lead to career advancement,163 or as a “business investment.”164
Darryl explained: “I didn’t want to be in a warehouse anymore. I
didn’t want to lay carpet anymore. I didn’t want to wash dishes
anymore, and I didn’t want to scrub floors anymore.”165 Susie
disclosed, “I feel like just the way this society is built, you go to
college you make more money. The data shows it.”166 And Jesse
reflected on the messaging he had received since elementary
school that pointed to college as “the golden land” and “the only
means to success.”167 Cheryl explained her version of the
investment imperative:
I mean it’s kind of a typical, I think, Asian family story. Or
an immigrant family story. They just wanted me to have
something they didn’t[,] and in their eyes[,] education was
the only way to become successful. So like going to get my
undergrad and then going directly to grad school or some
type of higher education is the only way that I could make
money . . . . Because they’re kind of stuck in one economic
status and their income is kind of, it’s not fluid. It’s very
static so the only way to kind of get above that bracket is to
go to school.168
While not everyone shared the same story, the investment
imperative acted as connective tissue throughout the data.

was going to be the next step away from that . . . .”); Interview with Kansas Borrower Four
(Aug. 31, 2017) (“I wanted to be away from my family. I wanted to have my own place.”).
And many discussed the importance of developing skills and opening their world views. See,
e.g., Interview with New York Borrower Two (Oct. 16, 2017) (“I think education, in a way,
just helps you to branch out and open new doors and give you ideas and open your own
resources to the things that you could use and need.”). Several also noted that a bachelor’s
degree would not provide a sufficient return on investment, requiring further higher
education. See Interview with New York Borrower Three (Oct. 16, 2017); Interview with
New York Borrower Eight (Oct. 17, 2017); Interview with Texas Borrower Ten (Feb. 19,
2018); Interview with Texas Borrower Eleven (Feb. 19, 2018).
162. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Three (Jan. 17, 2018) (“I mean, I just saw it
as a step so I can have a full-time career so I can make the money to pay it back . . . .”).
163. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Five (Jan. 18, 2018).
164. Interview with Kansas Borrower Three (Aug. 30, 2017).
165. Interview with Illinois Borrower Eight (Jan. 20, 2018).
166. Interview with New York Borrower Four (Oct.16, 2017).
167. Interview with North Carolina Borrower Three (Sept. 3, 2017).
168. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017); see also Interview with
Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017) (“My dad just said that if I go to college it’s a way to
improve your life, to do better . . . .”); Interview with New York Borrower Three (Oct. 16,
2017) (“They thought that if I went to college, I would be able to get a job and work fulltime and get money.”).
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Because students are conditioned to see higher education as
an imperative investment in their own human capital,169 many fail
to connect college attendance with college financing. It is college
at any cost. Respondents noted that they “didn’t consider the
tuition part,”170 didn’t “remember payment coming up” during the
application process,171 and that affordability was an
“afterthought.”172 While the language and attitude differed across
respondents, several who qualified for a Pell Grant also noted a
disconnect between attending college and paying for college. For
example, Diana explained:
I just never thought of the cost really, because I always just
knew it was something that I was gonna do, so I never . . . I
don’t know. I just always knew I was gonna take out loans to
cover what scholarships I couldn’t get. So, I never even was
thinking, even though I worked a lot in high school, I was
never thinking, “Oh, I should be saving some money so that
I can support myself when I go to school.” It was so off my
radar.173
LaToya expressed a similar sentiment:
At some point it wasn’t even a question of whether I would
go to college or not, I just knew I was going. As far as figuring
out how to pay for college, there was no discussion within the
home. We just kind of assumed that you were just going to
go, it didn’t matter how you got there, you were going to go.174
Like LaToya, many other low-income students made similar
pronouncements.175
169. See Kraiem, supra note 11, at 706–07 (arguing that “[t]he language of individual
investment in human capital” is powerful and is the “primary way that we talk about higher
education . . . .”).
170. Interview with Illinois Borrower Ten (Jan. 20, 2018); see also Interview with
Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018) (describing how she was not thinking about how
to pay, but rather “just thinking about the quality of education I wanted to get”).
171. Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018).
172. Interview with Illinois Borrower Three (Jan. 17, 2018).
173. Interview with Kansas Borrower Eight (Sept. 1, 2017).
174. Interview with North Carolina Borrower Two (Aug. 4, 2017).
175. LaToya qualified for a Pell Grant, an indicator that she comes from a low-income
family. Others also qualified for Pell Grants. See Interview with California Borrower Six
(Apr. 14, 2018) (noting that her dad indicated that cost didn’t matter as long as she went to
college); Interview with Illinois Borrower Eight (Jan. 20, 2018) (recognizing that the
messaging about the necessity of college depressed the need to understand or limit loans);
Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018) (acknowledging that she was not
thinking about how to pay for her higher education, instead focusing only on the desired
quality of education); Interview with Kansas Borrower Three (Aug. 30, 2017) (recognizing
that her conversations with her parents about attending college did not include discussions
of how to pay for college); Interview with Kansas Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017) (referring
to conversations with his parents about college, stating: “[I]t was basically like, ‘It doesn’t
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Because attendance—and not financing—was the primary
motivator, many respondents borrowed indiscriminately to
finance their education. Several signed loan documents without
worrying about the costs that would accrue. Respondents
explained, “I was like yes I’ll take it all because I didn’t know what
I would need, and what would happen basically[,]”176 and “[i]t felt
like plugging my nose and diving in.”177 William described feeling
disconnected from the loan dollars, only to be hit with reality at a
later date. He recalled:
Even though I was taking out loans for . . . summer school
and loans were coming out there and here, . . . I didn’t feel
like it affected me directly, it was just numbers going up and
down; my bank account, or the game I was playing with
the . . . Financial Office[,] . . . [b]ut it never really felt real.178
An even greater number of respondents noted that they did
not understand the loans they were accepting. They failed to
understand the amount accrued,179 interest rates,180 repayment
plans and options,181 or the difference between a grant and a
loan.182 Some admitted to signing loan documents they did not
read or understand.183 Stephanie lamented, “I realized as a firstmatter how much money it costs. . . . [I]f you have to get loans you just have to do it’”);
Interview with Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017) (discussing finding herself at college
without having considered the costs); Interview with New York Borrower Six (Oct. 17, 2017)
(noting that there was no question that she was going to college, but that “how [she was]
going to pay for it was very different. . . . that was just up in the air”); Interview with Texas
Borrower Six (Feb. 17, 2018) (recognizing that cost wasn’t a big factor in her decision to
attend an HBCU, although “it probably should have been”); Interview with Texas Borrower
Eleven (Feb. 19, 2018) (cost was part of the conversation about choosing colleges, but “it
wasn’t a major factor” and “wasn’t even in the top three . . . .”).
176. Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018); see also Interview with New
York Borrower Seven (Oct. 17, 2017) (“I think I just took honestly whatever was offered as
part of the package. I definitely didn’t make any decisions at that time to say like well
actually I need less or I’ll just make up the difference with my other side jobs. I just took
whatever was on the paper, and I got the refund and I was happy with it.”).
177. Interview with Kansas Borrower Eight (Sept. 1, 2017).
178. Interview with Illinois Borrower Thirteen (Jan. 20, 2018). Borrowing
indiscriminately does not necessarily mean borrowing enough. Contrary to the popular
conception of overly indulged college students, for many students, even the full financial
aid package offered is insufficient to support basic needs while in college. GOLDRICK-RAB,
supra note 3, at 235–36 (“Relying on standard aid numbers, which frequently overestimate
a family’s ability to pay and underestimate the true cost of attendance, provides a false
sense of assurance that a full aid package (such as that offered by well-endowed private
schools) truly takes money off the table for some students.”); see also infra note 257.
179. Interview with New York Borrower Six (Oct. 17, 2017).
180. Interview with Illinois Borrower Three (Jan. 17, 2018).
181. Interview with New York Borrower Two (Oct. 16, 2017).
182. Interview with North Carolina Borrower One (Aug. 4, 2017).
183. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I remember signing
stuff and not reading it.”); Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I very
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year student, I didn’t know the different types of loans. That was
not explained to me at all, like subsidized, unsubsidized, private,
federal. Who the hell is Sallie [Mae]? Why do I hate her so much
now?”184 Our data are consistent with other data. One nationallyrepresentative study of first-year college students holding federal
loans found a “surprisingly large fraction of . . . students were
unaware of how much they borrowed when asked less than a year
after they signed the promissory notes for their loans.”185 It further
found that no more than 25 percent of students could accurately
state their total borrowing within 10 percent, with half
underestimating their debt and the other quarter overestimating
their debt.186 The researchers found that more than one-quarter of
the borrowers did not understand that they held federal loans and
14 percent did not understand that they had any debt at all.187
For several of the students interviewed, parents or other
trusted adults took responsibility for the student’s financial aid
application, even though the loans were in the student’s name.188
Chelsea remarked, “Well, my dad told me about [a college] and I
didn’t realize it, but next thing I knew is I was here and I didn’t
really think about money or nothing.”189 Ebony recalled, “The
finances were really my parents. . . . But I was oblivious to my
finances for college until after when I found out I had [loans] in my
name.”190 Tracey remembered that a family friend helped her mom
understand how to finance college and apply for loans. Tracey
recalled:
I wouldn’t know what was going on because the things were
in my name and she would give me my password and login
information, I rarely used it, though I had access to it. I feel
like she was very involved, my mom was very involved, I
wasn’t very involved. Until it was time to start paying them
much remember applying for loans and I just felt like I was signing something that I didn’t
really understand what that meant for me.”).
184. Interview with California Borrower Eight (Apr. 15, 2018).
185. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 112 (citing ELIZABETH J. AKERS & MATTHEW
M. CHINGOS, ARE COLLEGE STUDENTS BORROWING BLINDLY? 9 tbl.1 (2014), https://www.br
ookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Are-College-Students-Borrowing-Blindly_Dec-20
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/32FJ-52V6]).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 113.
188. It is important to acknowledge that our sample skewed young. This would likely
be different for the increasing number of students entering postsecondary education at a
more advanced age.
189. Interview with Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017).
190. Interview with Texas Borrower Two (Feb. 17, 2018); see also Interview with Texas
Borrower Four (February 17, 2018) (recalling being unaware of a loan his father had taken
out in his name until his junior year of college).
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back, and then I found myself logging in more often to see
what I needed to do.191

Luke had a similar experience:
I can’t remember, I honestly can’t remember, but I took the
thing that my dad was like, ‘Take that.’ And then he’s like,
‘I’ll help you pay for it.’ Which is kind of a funny thing
because you take out a loan only in your name . . . . I’ve never
had that conversation with him, it’s just that I have all this
debt in my name now . . . .192
Students who made college choices without considering the
costs, borrowed indiscriminately, or failed to understand the costs
they were accruing are not outliers.193 Rather, they are the
norm.194 They have bought into the investment imperative and put
their faith in higher education. Many have taken on significant
debt. This paradigm is, of course, regulated and governed by the
laws and policies discussed above—the laws and policies that were
themselves influenced by the investment imperative. The
confluence of the policy’s and borrower’s adoption of the
investment imperative thus distorts students’ decision-making
about attending and financing their college education. The next
Part identifies and explores those effects and their consequences.
IV. THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE DISTORTS CONSUMER
DECISION-MAKING
It is possible to understand the investment imperative as a
positive construct that leads to increased access to higher
education and greater ultimate economic security for those who
answer its call. In fact, there is great value in holding up a dream
for which children and young adults can strive. This is especially
true in today’s economy, where a college degree is often the key to
the labor market.195 And even though there is discussion of a
191. Interview with Texas Borrower Six (Feb. 17, 2018).
192. Interview with California Borrower Seven (Apr. 15 2018).
193. AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 28 (“[T]here is strong evidence that most
students do not have an accurate understanding of how much debt they have.”).
194. Id.
195. See GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 237–38 (“But college is now essential, and
unfortunately there are no alternatives. . . . [I]f you cannot attend college, you’re lost. You
are systemically locked out of nearly every decent-paying job opportunity, every safe
neighborhood, and every opportunity to create safe futures for your children.”); LeMay &
Cloud, supra note 95, at 79 (“For the 17,487,475 students enrolled in colleges and
universities, access to postsecondary education is perhaps the one best hope for personal
fulfillment, vocational success, social mobility, and economic security.”); Sima J. Gandhi,
Understanding Students from a Behavioral Economics Perspective: How Accelerating
Student Loan Subsidies Generates More Bang for the Buck, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 130,
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“student debt crisis,”196 several scholars argue that, on average,
borrowing for college is a wise investment.197
What has generally been ignored, however, are the ways that
the investment imperative drives and distorts consumers’
decisions about their higher education, especially with respect to
financing. Building on the previous Part’s discussion of
indiscriminate borrowing, this Part identifies and explores two
effects of the investment imperative on students and their
families.
First, it argues that the investment imperative encourages an
information ostrich effect, whereby student borrowers ignore and
avoid information related to the costs and financing of their
education and, thus, their education debt. This ostrich effect
makes information campaigns ineffective and creates
opportunities for bad actors to exploit the investment imperative
to take advantage of vulnerable students.
Second, this Part argues that the investment imperative
creates the conditions for a student debt cascade for certain
borrowers who find that their financial reality post-graduation
does not match what the investment imperative seems to promise.
For those graduates (or nongraduates), who feel that their student
debt outweighs the value they received from their education,
feelings of shame or disappointment can lead to avoidance and,
ultimately, default on their education debt. Aggressive collection
techniques reinforce distress emotions, cost the taxpayer money,
and do nothing to advance society.

136 (2007–2008) (citing to a series of studies that establish the gap in economic security
between college graduates and those without degrees).
196. See, e.g., ANNE JOHNSON ET AL., THE STUDENT DEBT CRISIS 15 (2012), https://
www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/WhiteStudentDebt-5.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7J3A-9YPS] (defining the current student debt situation as a “crisis”); Tom
Lindsay, New Report: The U.S. Student Loan Debt Crisis Is Even Worse than We Thought,
FORBES (May 24, 2018, 11:07 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomlindsay/2018/05/24/new
-report-the-u-s-student-loan-debt-crisis-is-even-worse-than-we-thought/#12809284e438
[https://perma.cc/5HAX-KRAP] (defining the current student debt situation as a “crisis”).
But see Baum, supra note 17, at 40–41 (arguing that aggregate debt numbers overestimate
the level of “crisis” for the majority of student borrowers, for whom the decision to invest in
higher education will have a sufficient financial return); Morgan Housel, Student Loan
Bubble: Not as Bad as It Looks, MOTLEY FOOL, https://www.fool.com/investing/general
/2012/06/01/student-loan-bubble-not-as-bad-as-it-looks.aspx [https://perma.cc/6ZVR-9G3A]
(last updated Apr. 7, 2017); Tami Luhby, There Is No Student Loan “Crisis”, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 30, 2012, 4:17 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/30/news/economy/student-loans
/index.htm [https://perma.cc/SGZ2-Q82Y].
197. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 17, at 38.
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A. The Ostrich Effect
Borrowed from cognitive science and behavioral economics,
the “ostrich effect” is the tendency for people to avoid negative
information in favor of positive information.198 In an oft-cited
paper exploring whether investors seek out information about
their stock portfolios, economists Niklas Karlsson, George
Loewenstein, and Duane Seppi found that investors exhibited an
“ostrich effect” when it came to their own stock portfolios. Given
bad or ambiguous market information, investors avoided
collecting information on their stock portfolios; given positive
market information, the investors sought out updates on their
stock portfolios.199
The investment imperative encourages a similar ostrich effect
with respect to information about higher education quality and
financing. It emphasizes the positive outcomes of higher education
and ignores or discounts the costs. Even more obviously, the
investment imperative implies that each individual person who
attains higher education will see the socioeconomic bump that the
aggregate data show, without accounting for individual deviation,
clusters of vulnerable borrowers, or exploitation arising out of lax
regulation. This “promise” encourages the ostrich effect in
students, especially those reliant on credit-financed education. It
becomes unnecessary to seek out information about instructional
quality or loan financing terms because higher education is
imperative, and loans are often the only means of accessing that
education. The ostrich effect is evident both prior to college
attendance and in repayment after graduation.
1. Pre-College. Ideally, prospective college students will
engage in a cost-benefit analysis prior to beginning college. Those
students might best assess the likely value of their education prior
to accepting a spot at a college or university. Students rarely
undertake this assessment, however, in part because the task is
nearly impossible. And in the face of that near impossibility, the
ostrich effect—driven by the investment imperative—justifies the
borrower’s choice to ignore information about her prospective
education and related debt.
To accurately assess the financial benefit of a particular
college choice, a student would need to accurately predict the value
of her major and degree from a particular institution in a specific
198. See supra note 23.
199. Niklas Karlsson et al., The Ostrich Effect: Selective Attention to Information, 38
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 104–06 (2009).
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geographic region, approximately five years into the future.200 She
would also need to accurately predict whether and how quickly she
would attain that degree. To accurately assess the financial cost of
a particular college choice, the student would need to understand
and accurately predict her financial aid package, the tuition and
costs of her college attendance, and account for any financial
changes for a period of approximately five years.201 These are
nearly impossible tasks. Colleges make promises, but do not
deliver. Students change majors or fail to graduate. Students and
their families suffer financial emergencies. Financial aid packages
change over time. Tuition and fees change over time. Life is messy,
complicated, and difficult to predict.
No wonder prospective students ignore the cost of their
education and focus instead on the investment in themselves. It is
easier to rely on the investment imperative and the construct of
education debt as “good debt.”202 In this way, the ostrich effect is
connected to the related problem of hyperbolic discounting, a
concept that explains why people generally choose a smaller
benefit that they will realize sooner over a larger benefit that they
will realize later.203 The temporal distance of education debt
repayment exacerbates the ostrich effect; it is easy to put the
concern off for another day. Darryl recognized that he did not think
about his loans during school, “just . . . studying, getting by, and
. . . deal[ing] with [loans] later.”204 Christopher agreed:
I remember applying for the loans and I remember thinking
to myself, I’m not understanding very well what these loans
mean with the interest rate and all of that. I remember

200. Assuming that the prospective student is making this decision in the fall of their
senior year in high school and matriculating to a four-year college or university, from which
she will graduate on time.
201. In fact, studies show that borrowers and their families have great anxiety about
changes to the cost of education during the course of the student’s education. GOLDRICKRAB, supra note 3, at 159 (citing a 2014 national survey showing that nearly one-third of
parents of low-income college students were seriously concerned about diminishing grant
aid, increased tuition, and increased loan rates).
202. Unlike mortgage debt, which is also considered “good debt” or “investment debt,”
see, e.g., Abbye Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage Discrimination in Consumer Bankruptcy, 57
ARIZ. L. REV. 1041, 1064 (2015) (recognizing that both education debt and mortgage debt
are considered “good debt”), education debt is riskier because the debtor cannot mitigate
losses, see Glater, supra note 4, at 1581 (“A student borrower cannot resell her education to
reduce losses.”).
203. See Gandhi, supra note 195, at 140–41 (arguing that the behavioral economics
concepts of myopia and hyperbolic discounting occur in education lending because they
explain how people value proximity over magnitude).
204. Interview with Illinois Borrower Eight (Jan. 20, 2018).
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thinking, “I’ll worry about that later. You know I don’t have
to pay that for the next four years.”205

Many borrowers are financially unprepared before they begin
college.206 When asked whether he received any guidance about
applying for education loans, Riley lamented, “I wish I hadn’t been
so young and dumb.” When the researcher mentioned, “[t]he
person before you literally said young and dumb also,” Riley
replied, “[c]ause at the time, you’re just like, ‘Oh, I’m going to pay
this back. I’ll get a job. No big deal,’ and you know, here we are.”207
Joseph described the moment during his senior year in college,
when he and other graduating seniors went to a student loan
counseling meeting and, for the first time, he realized the amount
of education debt he had amassed.208 He recalled getting an
envelope and learning that he was expected to pay the loans
beginning six months from graduation.209 Joseph described the
collective shock:
And we had been living in fantasy land or something, you
know. And I got my envelope, and literally this is last
semester of senior year, and [I] had never thought about
what this is actually costing me, or what it was costing my
parents. I just knew I was there, I was doing good . . . . But
then at the end, and the winner is, and it was like . . .
$16,000.210
Darryl, Christopher, Riley, and Joseph shared common
experiences.211 Entering the education loan market for the first
time and inundated with messages of the investment imperative,
it was easy for them to ignore the effects of debt or put off the
effects until later. 212 And when financial aid packages are hard to
205. Interview with New York Borrower Two (Oct. 16, 2017) (also recalling, “[t]o be
honest, I think my mindset was I’ll worry about it later because I wasn’t taught completely
to worry about those things now and how those things impact me later”).
206. See, e.g., Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018) (“Definitely not
financially prepared.”); Interview with Illinois Borrower Thirteen (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I think
money was a very abstract thing.”).
207. Interview with Texas Borrower Three (Feb. 17, 2018).
208. Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018).
209. Id.
210. Id. (noting that one could look around the room and witness other people’s similar
reaction and shock).
211. See supra notes 204–10.
212. Michael C. Macchiarola & Arun Abraham, Options for Student Borrowers: A
Derivatives-Based Proposal to Protect Students and Control Debt-Fueled Inflation in the
Higher Education Market, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 98 (2010) (arguing that a
student-borrower is a “one-time participant in the higher education market” and “the party
least equipped to make an accurate value judgment regarding educational options and
costs”).
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understand,213 but easy to sign, it is easy to put one’s head in the
sand and ignore the down-the-road effects of the debt.
2. Post-College. Six months after college graduation or
dropping below half-time student status, most borrowers must
begin repaying their federal loans.214 Federal borrowers have
many options, and various rights, during the repayment of their
loans. For example, although a borrower is automatically enrolled
in a standard ten-year fixed repayment plan, she can instead opt
in to one of four income-driven repayment plans, which allow
borrowers to pay 10 to 20 percent of their discretionary income
toward their student loan over the course of twenty to twenty-five
years, after which their remaining debt is forgiven.215 She can also
seek loan deferment or loan forbearance under certain
circumstances.216
Data show, however, that borrowers are not taking advantage
of their rights and options while in repayment.217 Our respondents
offer a clue as to why that is.
213. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018) (“I feel like it’s just . . .
murky waters . . . I feel like I probably need to know a lot more, and figure out exactly what
my debt is. . . . [T]he problem is that I don’t even know where to start asking the right
questions . . . .”).
214. Understanding Repayment, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/re
pay-loans/understand#when-begin [https://perma.cc/4XDD-EQJX] (last visited Sept. 12,
2019).
215. The income-driven repayment plans include Income-Based Repayment Plan, Pay
As You Earn Repayment Plan, Revised Pay As You Earn Repayment Plan, and IncomeContingent Repayment Plan. Income-Driven Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://student
aid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-driven [https://perma.cc/F7NC-5UK8]
(last visited Sept. 12, 2019). For a full understanding of Income-Driven Repayment (IDR)
plans and possibilities for IDR-based reform, see Brooks, supra note 24, at 849–56.
216. Only certain loans (direct subsidized loans and federal Perkins loans) are eligible
for deferment, during which time interest does not continue to accrue. Deferment and
Forbearance, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/deferment-forbe
arance#what-are [https://perma.cc/W2W8-2629] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). For the
majority of loans, a borrower can only seek forbearance, during which time payments are
not due, but interest continues to accrue and is capitalized into the principal of the loan at
the close of the forbearance period. Id.
217. For example, regulators alleged that loan servicers have steered borrowers into
forbearance without explaining the financial consequences, even when the borrower may
be eligible for an income-driven repayment plan at a low- or no-cost monthly payment. See
CFPB Sues Nation’s Largest Student Loan Company Navient for Failing Borrowers at Every
Stage of Repayment, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinan
ce.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nations-largest-student-loan-company-navient-failing
-borrowers-every-stage-repayment/ [https://perma.cc/UNB4-Z2XR] (last visited Sept. 12,
2019). But see U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE DEPARTMENT’S
COMMUNICATION REGARDING THE COSTS OF INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT PLANS AND LOAN
FORGIVENESS PROGRAMS 3, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2018/a
09q0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R6B-ZYJJ] (finding a six-fold increase in the number of
borrowers taking advantage of IDR plans between 2011 and 2015).
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First, they remain confused about their loans even after they
leave college.218 Cheryl explained, “I didn’t even know where to pay
it when I graduated. I had no idea. Then I kept getting letters from
a program, or some company, but I didn’t recognize the company
name so I thought it was a scam.”219 And Chrystal explained:
So when I graduated, it was like, I had a hell of a time
figuring out who owned all of my loans, and I had no idea
how much I had in all. It wasn’t until I started getting the
bills in that I was able to put together how much I owed, who
owned what, where all the payments needed to go, [and] how
much they were going to be.220
Second, they do not believe that they are entitled to advocacy
with respect to their student debt. Although education debt is
governed by statute and regulation, borrowers generally do not see
student debt problems as legal problems or problems for which
they are entitled to advocacy. When asked whether they might
seek legal assistance for a student debt issue, the majority of our
respondents answered in the negative.221 Respondents told
researchers that they would not seek legal assistance because “I
wouldn’t know what I would be seeking it for,”222 “I didn’t think I
had a case,”223 and “I don’t know if that’s even possible.”224 Josh,
who was seeking forgiveness through the Public Service Loan
Forgiveness Program, which is a program governed by law and
regulation, engaged in the following exchange:
INT: And if you hit some snag in getting [your loans]
forgiven, would you consider seeking legal assistance?
RES: Probably not. I’d probably again, just being like, “[y]ou
should have been on top of this,” Right? Like I should have
been checking on my payment plans, I should have been
paying more attention. I felt like that would have been on
me.225

218. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 28 (“[T]here is strong evidence that most
students do not have an accurate understanding of how much debt they have.”).
219. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017).
220. Interview with New York Borrower Six (Oct. 17, 2017).
221. This is consistent with bankruptcy research. See Foohey, supra note 23, at 1322
(finding that faith leaders were hesitant to turn to the bankruptcy system to deal with their
institutions’ financial concerns, unwilling to see them as a “legal problem”).
222. Interview with Illinois Borrower Ten (Jan. 20, 2018); see also Interview with
Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I wouldn’t know what I would seek legal
assistance for.”).
223. Interview with California Borrower Three (Apr. 14, 2018).
224. Interview with North Carolina Borrower Seven (Apr. 5, 2018).
225. Interview with Texas Borrower Eleven (Feb. 19, 2018).
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Similar studies establish that, in general, low- and moderateincome people hesitate to turn to the legal system, even when they
have a legal claim.226
I suggest that both the confusion and the timidity is related
to the investment imperative and the ostrich effect. In much the
same way that the investment imperative distorts prospective
students’ view of higher education as disconnected from cost, upon
reflection, students justify their decisions through the lens of the
investment imperative. It is possible that shame and fear underlie
that reflection, an issue that is further explored in Section IV.B.
3. The Ostrich Effect Leads to Exploitation. The ostrich
effect is problematic because it discourages prospective students
from assessing the potential benefits and actual costs of their
education. It also discourages post-college debtors from taking full
advantage of their rights and responsibilities under the law,
making it more likely that they will have bad financial outcomes.
Perhaps most importantly, bad actors can—and do—exploit the
combination of the investment imperative and the ostrich effect.
In the education debt context, exploitation arises primarily in
two contexts: recruitment and repayment. In recruiting students,
institutions can exploit the investment imperative and
information gap to encourage students to attend ineffective
institutions. The for-profit-college industry most clearly illustrates
this dynamic. The for-profit-college industry has been plagued
with allegations of fraud, corruption, and provision of ineffective
educational services.227 Tressie McMillan Cottom defines the
problem as “Lower Ed”: “Lower Ed is the subsector of high-risk
[postsecondary] schools and colleges . . . . Lower Ed encompasses
all credential expansion that leverages our faith in education
without challenging its market imperatives and that preserves the
status quo of race, class, and gender inequalities in education and
work.”228 Exploiting the investment imperative, Lower Ed colleges
recruit vulnerable students (and their federal loan dollars). Those
institutions exploit the investment imperative and information
asymmetry in recruitment, preying on vulnerable prospective
226. Foohey, supra note 23, at 1325 (citing studies). Student borrowers might, for
example, have a legal claim against the Department of Education for failing to follow its
regulations, against a lender for unfair debt collection practices, or against a debt
consolidation company for unfair or deceptive practices. Even in the absence of a litigable
legal claim, lawyers regularly help clients understand their rights and navigate
administrative processes.
227. See SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR AND PENSIONS, supra note 118, at
1–6.
228. COTTOM, supra note 2, at 11–12.
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students. Such institutions, for example, train recruiters to
identify and “‘poke the pain points’ of wavering prospective
students to remind them of why they need a degree.”229 One forprofit marketing executive explained how his college recruited
women who had been traumatized: they hired female recruiters to
play the “good-enough mother” to recruits, offering them
absolution (in the form of college attendance) to move past the
trauma.230 In other words, they explicitly and expressly exploited
the prospective student’s traumatic history to convince her to
enroll in the institution. Cottom likens for-profit recruiters to
television evangelists posing as priests, “sell[ing] prayer cloths
that promise to solve all of a believer’s problems.”231 The
investment imperative and the ostrich effect thus create a loop of
vulnerability. Recruiters best exploit the investment imperative
when the recruit has less information; recruits buy into the
investment imperative, which itself justifies a student’s lack of
information.
This vulnerability loop does not break when the student
graduates or otherwise leaves full-time higher education. Scams
and exploitation also flourish during repayment. Debt settlement
and debt consolidation companies seek out vulnerable debtors and
sell them services that promise to lower monthly payments or
forgive education debt altogether.232 Some companies charge for
services that can be accomplished by the borrower for free at the
Department of Education’s StudentLoans.gov website or through
the borrower’s loan servicer.233 When they charge an up-front fee
229. Id. at 129; see also SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, supra
note 118, at 3 (discussing the recruiting process for for-profit education companies as being
a sales process).
230. COTTOM, supra note 2, at 107.
231. Id. at 6.
232. See, for example, the Federal Trade Commission’s “Operation Game of Loans,” a
“coordinated federal-state law enforcement initiative targeting deceptive student loan debt
relief scams.” Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC, State Law Enforcement Partners
Announce Nationwide Crackdown on Student Loan Debt Relief Scams (Oct. 13, 2007), htt
ps://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/10/ftc-state-law-enforcement-partners-a
nnounce-nationwide-crackdown [https://perma.cc/5XXT-PQ5S].
233. For example, borrowers can consolidate their loans, change their repayment plan,
or seek a deferment or forbearance at no cost by calling their servicer or applying through
the Department of Education website. See Loan Consolidation, FED. STUDENT AID, https://
studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/consolidation [https://perma.cc/2QF8-Q8MK] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2019) (“There is no application fee to consolidate your federal education loans into
a Direct Consolidation Loan. You may be contacted by private companies that offer to help
you apply for a Direct Consolidation Loan, for a fee. These companies have no affiliation
with the U.S. Department of Education (ED) or ED’s consolidation loan servicers. There’s
no need to pay anyone for assistance in getting a Direct Consolidation Loan. The application
process is easy and free.”).
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for those services, debt-settlement companies often violate state
and federal law.234 Some companies charge for services that
promise impossible outcomes, like loan forgiveness. Those charges
and misstatements violate state and federal law.235 Together,
these companies have taken almost $100 million in illegal upfront
fees from American borrowers.236 Fraudulent debt settlement and
consolidation scams are enticing because student borrowers are
overwhelmed by their debt and lack proper information about
their rights and responsibilities as a debtor. These scams similarly
exploit the intersection of the investment imperative and the
ostrich effect because they bank on debtors who are too
overwhelmed, embarrassed, ashamed, or otherwise unable to seek
out information about their rights and responsibilities in
repayment.237
4. Is More Information the Easy Answer? Some might argue
that the information gap has an easy fix—provide students with
more information or make information more accessible. In fact,
several organizations, including the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) and various nonprofits, have tried to
fill the information gap.238 Proposed legislation to overhaul the
Higher Education Act proposes a college dashboard website that
would provide information to students on institution type,
enrollment, student/faculty ratio, graduation rates, average net
price, average student loan debt, and median earnings of
graduates.239 Some also argue that the information is already
234. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 232.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. For a further discussion of shame and distress emotions related to student debt,
see infra Section IV.B and also Greene, supra note 131, at 275–76 (arguing that debt
settlement and debt consolidation services are consistent with a “self-sufficiency narrative”
and “a moral alternative to bankruptcy and government ‘handouts’”).
238. Student Loans, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfina
nce.gov/consumer-tools/student-loans/ [https://perma.cc/2UGX-QWLZ] (last visited Sept.
12, 2019); Project on Student Debt, INST. FOR C. ACCESS & SUCCESS, https://ticas.org/posd/
home [https://perma.cc/5M7S-2GDJ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). In fact, the CFPB’s
supervisory authority broadly permits it to document, oversee enforce, and regulate issues
related to student loans. Laurie A. Lucas & Christopher L. Peterson, Developments in
Federal Student-Lending Law: Harbingers of Change?, 72 BUS. LAW. 465, 466–68 (2017).
Recently, however, moves at the CFPB suggest that information campaigns may be the
Bureau’s primary goal with respect to student loans in the near future. See Zack Friedman,
CFPB Makes Major Changes to Student Loans Office, FORBES (May 10, 2018, 8:17 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2018/05/10/student-loans-changes-consumer/#
671b3ba91a4c [https://perma.cc/5EVP-FTW6] (noting that the CFPB recently decided to
fold its student loan office into the financial education office).
239. See PROSPER Act, H.R. 4508, 115th Cong. § 121(d) (2017).
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available, and it is the borrower’s responsibility to seek out and
utilize the information.240
While providing more information to borrowers is a valuable
goal, it will only be useful if done correctly.241 Bridging the
information gap will only affect behavior if prospective, current,
and former students can receive, process, and understand the
information. Further, more information will only be helpful if
prospective students have better or varied choices. Because college
matriculation and financing are driven by the investment
imperative, providing additional information alone is unlikely to
alter behavior—or the vulnerability that stems from the
information asymmetry—significantly. This is not to say that
information campaigns are not useful; rather, information
campaigns are not, by themselves, sufficient.
Our data suggest that information before matriculation is not
sticky for new college students in large part because of the
investment imperative.242 LaToya recalled:
So, I always thought I was going to college. I think it was
more of my parents pushing me towards that direction. At
some point it wasn’t even a question of whether I would go to
college or not, I just knew I was going. As far as figuring out
how to pay for college, there was no discussion within the
home. We just kind of assumed that you were just going to
go, it didn’t matter how you got there, you were going to go.243
Jeffrey explained:
It was just always sort of assumed that I would probably get
some form of scholarship and that we would take out student
loans to take care of the rest, which I really wasn’t worried
about at the time because I thought, “oh, I’m going to medical

240. See Kraiem, supra note 11, at 713 (arguing that the current higher education
financing scheme adopts a consumer law mentality of caveat emptor, or “buyer beware”).
241. See D. James Greiner et al., Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119, 1135–36
(2017) (recognizing the difficulty in providing low- and moderate-income pro se plaintiffs
with useful self-help guides and proposing approaches, including plain-language,
illustrations and cartoon graphics, to better connect with unrepresented civil parties).
242. Cf. Jonathan D. Glater, The Unsupportable Cost of Variable Pricing of Student
Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2137, 2142–46 (2013) (critiquing the suggestion that
implementing variable interest rate education loans based on expected return-oninvestment will change student behavior). More and creative thinking in financial literacy
might be able to make inroads on this problem.
243. Interview with North Carolina Borrower Two (Aug. 4, 2017); see also Interview
with California Borrower Six (Apr. 14, 2018) (“[M]y dad was always like, ‘We’ll do whatever
it takes, it doesn’t matter where you want to go.’ You know, just kind of like as long as you
went it doesn’t really matter.”).
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school, I’m going to have a high paying career eventually, I’ll
be able to take care of this.”244

Thus, more information would not have changed these students’
behavior,245 either because the information did not seem
relevant246 or because additional information would not have
changed their limited choices.247 While additional information
about rights and responsibilities in repayment may offer some
debtors relief or the ability to avoid scams, the investment
imperative runs strong and deep. For many debtors, the sadness
and shame associated with their failed investment in self
exacerbates the ostrich effect and increases long-term negative
financial repercussions. The next Section takes up this idea
further.
B. The Student Debt Cascade
The investment imperative messages that college is a key to
socioeconomic advancement, with little limitation and
disconnected from the cost to the individual student. For many
graduates, the promise of the investment lives up to the reality.248
But for many others the promise of the investment does not line
up with the reality of their college experience or their post-college
financial lives.249 Thus, the investment imperative risks
244. Interview with Illinois Borrower Six (Jan. 20, 2018).
245. See, e.g., AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 111 (“It’s clear that a lack of
information has severely compromised students’ ability to make smart college-going and
borrowing decisions. Students haven’t been able to make cost-benefit calculations with nonexistent information on benefits and difficult-to-obtain information on costs. But as more
information becomes available, will it be enough to solve the broader decision-making
problem? The available evidence from education and other fields indicates that individuals
too often do not understand, much less make use of, the information that is available to
them. This means that simply providing more information to students is unlikely to change
their behavior.”).
246. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Thirteen (Jan. 20, 2018) (“I’m not really sure
[I would have taken advantage of information about student loans]. I guess it would help
with budgeting, but I think in terms of student debt, I wasn’t too worried about it because
there’s a 0% interest until I’m not a student anymore. And so, I didn’t really think about it
that much.”).
247. See Interview with Kansas Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017) (“So, if they could have
given me the exit counseling when they gave me the loans instead of after they’d already
disbursed all the loans to me, it might have changed my point of view a little bit. Probably
not, but maybe. I still needed the money, you know, at the end of the day.”); see also
COTTOM, supra note 2, at 170–73 (arguing that the credential-driven labor market, which
offers declining investment in workers, drives Lower Ed and that pointing to information
asymmetry as the problem ignores the fact that many students have no “rational
educational choice” in this new economy).
248. See infra notes 291–94 and accompanying text.
249. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 104 (recognizing that some individuals’
investments in higher education pay off better than others, but that “good decision making
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overpromising students certain financial outcomes from seeking a
college certification or degree, encouraging overconfidence in the
ability to repay education debt. It distorts both the input and the
output.
This distortion can lead to distress emotions250 and avoidance
of both information about the debt and of the debt itself. Avoidance
can then lead to nonpayment and, ultimately, default. At the end
of the day, the debt remains, and neither the borrower nor the
lender—the American taxpayer—is in any better situation.251 This
path—disconnect, distress emotions, avoidance, and default—is
the “student debt cascade,”252 and it is connected to the investment
imperative.
1. In School. The investment imperative maintains that
access to higher education is all that is necessary for a student to
be able to achieve success on her own merits. The concept is this:
once a student has access to enough loans—public, private,or
both—to attend a college or university, she is then on the same
level playing field as her peers and thus has the same opportunity
for success.253 If she fails, it is because of her own shortcomings.
But access to and enrollment in higher education do not even
the playing field for students from different backgrounds. Our
is made nearly impossible by the lack of information available to potential college
students”); GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 185 (“Students can enter college with great
expectations that are sometimes unrealistic. Ideally, colleges would help students realize
their ambitions, while also helping them understand reality—including the specific
requirements needed for graduation and the [post-college] implications of their choices.
That does not always happen.”).
250. See Austin, supra note 86, at 401–02 (citing studies that show that high debt
burdens can be associated with migraines, headaches, stomachaches, back pains, increased
risk of cardiovascular disease, hypertension, depression, higher mortality, including from
suicide, delayed medical and dental care, low self-esteem, social isolation, chronic tension,
and family problems, including higher rates of divorce).
251. The reason that the American taxpayer is harmed is because 90 percent of
student loans are currently made by the United States, through the Department of
Education. Brooks, supra note 24, at 851. The Department then contracts with servicers
and debt collectors to service and collect on those loans. Loan Servicing Contracts, FED.
STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/business-info/contracts/loanservicing [https://perma.cc/3LE3-L29A] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
252. This Article introduces the “student debt cascade” theory as it emerged out of the
qualitative data. It ties the theory to the literature on student debt and financial insecurity
and uses the qualitative data to provide insight. It does not, however, fully flesh out the
theory or argue causality. Rather, it is an initial theory that should be expanded and tested
with additional scholarly and empirical work.
253. In this way, the investment imperative is deeply connected to the meritocracy
myth, a concept that has been heavily and thoroughly critiqued. See Anne Lawton, The
Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587,
591 (2000) (critiquing the meritocracy myth as it has been applied in employment law);
Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 586 (1996) (discussing
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data made clear that, for many students, they must balance their
educational aspirations against work and family requirements.
Contrary to popular belief, for many students, taking on the
maximum amount of subsidized and unsubsidized loans is not
sufficient to make financial ends meet while in college.254 Cheryl,
for example, explained how she worked multiple jobs while she
was in college:
To give you a sense of my schedule, I would maybe wake up
at four in the morning every day to go to my catering job in
the morning. And then right after I might have a class at like
ten or something and then I went to my afternoon job from,
maybe, eleven to two or three or maybe four. And then maybe
another class, like an evening class. And then I’d go straight
to my job at the restaurant until they closed maybe at like
ten. Cleaning up maybe at like eleven. Then I’d go to the
library after maybe until like one. And then I’d come home.
So it was just exhausting.255
Cheryl maintained that schedule for two years, averaging
approximately three hours of sleep per night.256
Laura told a similar story. She worked three jobs for three
years as an undergraduate, working in a research lab and as a tour
guide during the day and at SafeWalk from 11:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m.
When she lived off-campus in her junior and senior year, Laura
explained,
I slept in the library, so from about 3:30 until 7:30, about
three nights a week ’cause I didn’t have a car, and I didn’t
want to pay for a car, and the buses don’t run. Nothing runs

the meritocracy myth as it relates to women in the legal profession and arguing that the
myth relies on the assumptions that female lawyers are close to achieving proportionate
representation in the legal field and that any “lingering disparities” are the result of the
women’s “‘different’ choices and capabilities”); Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking
the Invisible Knapsack, PEACE & FREEDOM MAG., July/Aug. 1989 (identifying the privileges
attendant to whiteness and recognizing that “this is not such a free country; one’s life is not
what one makes it; many doors open for certain people through no virtues of their own”).
254. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 9 (“Financial aid often falls short—in terms of
both how much it pays for and how it is delivered.”). At first glance, this Section may appear
to be in tension with the “ostrich effect” argument. Yet, financial aid is insufficient, poorly
understood, bureaucratically complex, and based on a broken reliance on Estimated Family
Contribution (EFC); See also Brooks, supra note 24, at 858 (“The available [Federal Direct
Loan] debt is not sufficient to pay the average out of pocket costs of higher education.”). So,
both things can coexist. Students can be uninformed about their loans or even borrow
blindly for college and simultaneously be in a financially precarious situation while in
college.
255. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017).
256. Id.
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at that time. . . . Or I would go to the gym and go swimming
for a little bit, and then I would shower.257

In her book, Paying the Price, Sara Goldrick-Rab introduces
readers to Alicia, an African American single mother from
Milwaukee who dreamt of being a teacher or social worker.258
Alicia described her schedule during her first semester: she spent
seven and a half hours in class and four hours caring for her child.
On top of that, Alicia worked thirty hours a week and took out a
subsidized loan to pay for her college.259
Students also discussed family responsibilities; some had to
take care of family or had siblings come to live with them.260 Felix
explained:
My mother has schizoaffective disorder. She’s been a
struggle all of my life. She lived with my grandmother . . . .
She didn’t have the patience to deal with my mother[’]s crazy
in the way that was most useful, so I was back in [my
hometown] frequently with doctors appointments, with
filling out forms. I spent a lot of my college experience crying
on a phone with my mother getting her through her moments
of crazy. That was very present. That was very, very, very
present.261
Sarah also recalled providing a lot of emotional caretaking for her
sisters while she was in college, providing support for her family
after her mother died and while her father grieved.262 And
William’s sister lived with him his junior and senior year of
college, requiring emotional and financial support.263
Other respondents remembered having difficulty getting
enough to eat while in college.264 Cheryl noted that she chose a
257. Interview with North Carolina Borrower Five (Apr. 4, 2018). Laura continued, “I
would make an excellent homeless person.” Id.
258. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 195.
259. Id. at 196.
260. See also id. at 44 (citing Peter Kinsley’s study showing that 13 percent of the
students surveyed regularly provided financial support to family while in college).
261. Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017).
262. Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018).
263. Interview with Illinois Borrower Thirteen (Jan. 20, 2018).
264. This is consistent with other studies. See GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 128
(showing that 24 percent of students surveyed indicated that in the past month they did
not have enough money to buy food, ate less then they felt they should, or cut the size of
their meals because there was not enough money); KIM DANCY & BEN BARRETT, LIVING ON
CREDIT? AN OVERVIEW OF STUDENT BORROWING FOR NON-TUITION EXPENSES 10 (2018)
(citing a study showing that 11 percent of students at four-year colleges and 14 percent of
students at two-year colleges were food insecure); SARA GOLDRICK-RAB ET AL., COLLEGE
AND UNIVERSITY BASIC NEEDS INSECURITY: A NATIONAL #REALCOLLEGE SURVEY REPORT 2,
https://hope4college.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/HOPE_realcollege_National_report_
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restaurant job “mostly so I could get extra food so I didn’t have to
pay for food.”265 Others mentioned seeking emergency food aid266
or remembered “not quite knowing how I was going to eat.”267
Sarah explained:
Having enough food to eat was always a huge thing, but I
always found a way to make it work. Like, I would go to
campus events where there would be pizza, or something. Or,
I had friends that had extra dining dollars, and so I would
make sure to set up times to hang out with them and they
didn’t mind. So, it was always a nervousness, especially
when, of course, it came down to the beginning or the end of
the month, but I always found ways to make it work.268
While Laura said that her grades did not suffer from her
packed schedule, her quality of life suffered.269 And she was a
lucky one. For many others, working multiple jobs, dealing with
family obligations, or worrying about their next meal negatively
affected their ability to succeed in college.270 Sean lamented his
mediocre GPA, remembering, “[y]ou’re running from class to work,
or you’re running from work to class, or you’re just tired from all
the things that you’re doing.”271 Several respondents stated that
they worked forty or more hours per week, on top of their school
schedule, making it difficult to take full advantage of the
educational, social, and professional experiences available to
college students. Students who work multiple jobs while enrolled
in college lack time to network, attend professor office hours,
study, and sleep. Cheryl told researchers that having multiple jobs
digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AL7-SCLS] (of the 86,000 student survey respondents, 45
percent reported food insecurity, 56 percent reported housing insecurity, and 17 percent
reported homelessness in the prior year). For a thorough and complete understanding of
food insecurity for college students, see GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, and Sara GoldrickRab’s continued work.
265. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017).
266. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Seven (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with
Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017); Interview with Texas Borrower Eight (Feb. 18, 2018);
Interview with Texas Borrower Fourteen (Feb. 20, 2018).
267. Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018); see also Interview with New
York Borrower Seven (Oct. 17, 2017) (“There were times when I did worry about food or like
at the end of a semester like when your meal plan starts to run out . . . . There was some
pressure around those times so I was like what [am] I going to eat, what can I afford to
eat.”).
268. Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018).
269. Id.
270. See, e.g, Interview with North Carolina Borrower Eight (Apr. 20, 2018); Interview
with North Carolina Borrower Five (Apr. 4, 2018). Studies also show that financially
insecure students regularly neglected to purchase a course textbook, negatively affecting
their ability to learn and succeed in college. See DANCY & BARRETT, supra note 264, at 10.
271. Interview with Illinois Borrower One (Jan. 17, 2018).
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while in college negatively affected her mental health and her
grades.272 It also limited her ability to make connections with
professors, making it more difficult to ask for letters of
recommendation for law school.273 Cheryl had access to higher
education. The investment imperative would have us believe that
success was hers to win or lose. But Cheryl’s transcript, and her
professors’ recommendations, are unlikely to evidence her hard
work, undertaken against high odds. Alicia, from Paying the Price,
after facing personal crises and decreasing family support, took on
more childcare responsibilities, sought more hours at work, got
less sleep, and spent less time on schoolwork.274 By the end of her
sophomore year, Alicia had dropped out of school and stopped
responding to the researchers.275
It is impossible to ignore structural and institutional barriers
in discussing why certain individuals or groups more successfully
advance or maintain their socioeconomic standing. Yet the
investment imperative does not account for those barriers. And
when those barriers combine with the effects of student debt, they
are aggravated, especially for borrowers, like Alicia, who drop out
of college, borrowers like Cheryl, who were unable to compete on
an equal level, and other vulnerable borrowers. The next Section
pursues that further.
2. After School. For many, including some of our
respondents, the promise of the investment imperative did not pan
out in their financial lives post-college. Many questioned whether
the financial investment in their higher education provided a
sufficient financial return and several explicitly stated that it did
not. Even after recognizing that college changed his life for the
better, Felix admitted, “[i]t was more expensive than it should’ve
been. It was an incredibly valuable product and maybe not as
valuable as I paid, maybe not as valuable as the price.”276 Cheryl
would counsel prospective students to “[g]o to the place that you
can afford. It does have to have a good name, but don’t worry
yourself too much about getting into the biggest name because I
think you might be wasting your money, especially if you’re taking

272. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017); see also GOLDRICK-RAB,
supra note 3, at 99–101 (arguing that financial insecurity can have a profound effect on
students’ mental health, physical health, and graduation rates).
273. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017).
274. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 197.
275. Id. at 198.
276. Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017).
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loans.”277 Others had similar reactions, noting that “schooling was
very rewarding, [but] when I think of the finances it’s more of
confusion and regret too,”278 calling the promise of higher income
after college a “misconception,”279 and noting that “[c]ollege is not
worth it.”280
For several respondents, that disconnect was specifically
connected to their student debt. In other words, it was the burden
of education debt that limited their sense of post-graduation
financial stability.281 Matt commented, with respect to one of his
three degrees, “it was basically a waste of time, a waste of
money.”282 Georgia noted:
Honestly, a bachelor’s degree really doesn’t do that much
anymore. When I was looking for jobs, that was really
disheartening to me, because I was making these payments
and I wasn’t having any income. I was like, “I have this
degree, and I can’t even get a job to pay for my tuition that
got me this degree.” So I felt like it was kind of a waste.283
Although our study did not include students who dropped out
of school, the connection is worth considering carefully. Studies
show that there is a correlation between financial insecurity in
college, student debt, lower grades, and higher drop-out rates.284
This is particularly true for students of color.285 Some studies
specifically correlate working more than twenty hours a week
during college with dropping out.286 When students drop out of
college, however, their debt does not disappear. Federal data
showed that nearly four million undergraduates dropped out of
277. Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017).
278. Interview with Kansas Borrower Seven (Aug. 31, 2017). But see infra note 296
and accompanying text. Although the intrinsic benefits of higher education are outside the
scope of this project, it is important to recognize that many of our respondents recognized
benefits to their higher education experience that stood apart from their frustration with
the failed economic investment. The author plans to explore this further in future
scholarship.
279. Interview with New York Borrower Three (Oct. 16, 2017).
280. Interview with California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018).
281. See HUELSMAN, supra note 17, at 2–3 (finding that graduates with student debt
report a lower level of job satisfaction upon entering the workforce).
282. Interview with Illinois Borrower Four (Jan. 18, 2018).
283. Interview with California Borrower Nine (Apr. 15, 2018). This Article focuses
primarily on the investment imperative for college, but it will be interesting to follow
whether the same imperative emerges for graduate and professional school.
284. Brooks, supra note 24, at 859; Glater, supra note 4, at 1591.
285. Scholars have found a disproportionate relationship between financial insecurity
and drop-out rates for Black and Latino borrowers. HUELSMAN, supra note 17, at 14–16
(finding that approximately 70 percent of Black college dropouts cite student debt as a
primary reason for leaving school).
286. GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 3, at 104 (citing studies).
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college from mid-2014 to mid-2016, all carrying federal student
debt.287 The emotional and financial effect can be dramatic;
according to Robert Lowe, an education professor at Marquette
University, “[i]f students end up in debt, end up without a degree,
they end up damaged by the experience rather than expanded by
it.”288
Even for those who graduated, many find that student debt
limits their major adult choices. That was particularly true in our
sample. Ken eloquently explained:
There’s this wonderful writer named John Scalzi who wrote
an essay some years ago about being poor, about what it
means to be poor. And he says one of the defining elements
of being poor is paying for decisions you didn’t know you
made years ago. That’s basically what I’m doing. I had no
idea what I was getting myself into when I borrowed all of
this money, that I was basically kind of determining my
legacy in the United States, and here we are.289
Approximately one-third of our sample recognized that their
student debt affected their housing decisions and almost one in
five commented that their student debt affected family decisions,
like whether or when to get married or have children.290
Of course, for many respondents, the financial cost of their
higher education was well worth its value. For example, one
asserted, “I’ve loaned my way up to an upper middle-class
lifestyle,”291 another noted that the debt was “worth every
penny,”292 and yet another recognized that the degree “increased
my earning potential.”293 And for those who had negative feelings

287. Jill Barshay, Federal Data Shows 3.9 Million Students Dropped Out of College
with Debt in 2015 and 2016, HECHINGER REP. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://hechingerreport.org/
federal-data-shows-3-9-million-students-dropped-college-debt-2015-2016/ [https://perma.cc
/WAT8-AGHU] (citing data from the U.S. Department of Education’s College Scorecard).
288. Jamaal Abdul-Alim, Dropouts Tell No Tales, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept./Oct. 2013,
at 38, 39; Cf. Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role
of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2262 (2008) (recognizing that home
ownership does not inherently foster wealth development, positive social-psychological
states, or stable neighborhoods and communities; rising delinquency rates suggest that
home ownership and mortgage obligations can “undermine these objectives”).
289. Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018).
290. Cheryl, Sarah, and Felix—highlighted in Section IV.B.1—are all included in
those numbers. See also Kelchen, supra note 59, at 190–91 (cataloguing studies suggesting
that there is at least a modest negative relationship between student loan debt and delayed
adult outcomes, such as starting a family or buying a home).
291. Interview with Kansas Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017).
292. Interview with Kansas Borrower Five (Aug. 30, 2017).
293. Interview with Kansas Borrower Nine (Sept. 3, 2017).
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about their financial investment in higher education, many
remained positive about the intrinsic value of their education.294
It is impossible to know what the students’ financial lives
would have been like absent a college degree. One cannot test that.
One can only rely on the borrowers’ perceptions. It is those
perceptions, however, that are critical to the student debt cascade
because perception is what leads to distress emotions and
avoidance. And several respondents perceived a clear and unfair
disconnect between the investment they were promised and their
financial reality. Ebony stated, “I don’t think education
guarantees anything nowadays, unfortunately. Not like we
thought it would. Not like we were told it would.”295 Shelly
lamented:
If I’m being honest, I think I’d have been better off going to
trade school, and not going this route. Because you have, like
I said, we have these illusions of what a bachelor’s degree
would mean. And I don’t know, I don’t know if the payout
now is worth, did I really get my money’s worth? Am I really
capitalizing on anything that I got from this degree? And the
answer would probably be no.296
And Ken stated, “[o]ne of the reasons I freely borrowed so much
money on behalf of school is because I believed, ultimately, it was
for the greater good, and it turns out it’s actually been probably
the most defining great evil of my life.”297
Unsurprisingly, there is considerable evidence of distress
emotions, including anxiety, fear, or shame298 in graduates and
noncompleters who feel that their investment was, in some way,

294. See, e.g., Interview with Illinois Borrower Eleven (Jan. 20, 2018) (“[T]hat was the
great value for me of going away [to college] . . . . Just meeting people different from me,
and going to see more of the world.”); Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20,
2018) (“I think that [college] has been worth it. Like, ideologically and in terms of shaping
my values. . . . And then, learning how to be engaged in the community. I feel like those are
all important things.”); Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017) (“Just the
experience, incredible. [College] changed my life. It did exactly what I needed it to do. I was
looking for an escape from the crazy, it gave me the escape from the crazy. I was looking for
a group of people who would push me, and I found that in spades. I looked to create a family
and I created all kinds of family in this [college] community.”).
295. Interview with Texas Borrower Two (Feb. 17, 2018).
296. Interview with Texas Borrower Thirteen (Feb. 20, 2018).
297. Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018). One respondent who went
to law school described the outcome: “Investment wise, it’s a very bad investment.”
Interview with California Borrower Four (Apr. 14, 2018).
298. See Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer
Protection, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2017, at 178, 195 (measuring emotions,
including frustration, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, shame, and guilt in consumers who had
filed narrative complaints with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
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lacking.299 For example, Carrie made the explicit connection
between the sacrifices required by her education debt and distress
emotions:
I’ve definitely had those times in my life where I’ve been
feeling like I’m not really even . . . like I’m trying to pay and
I’m not living my life. I’m not able to go anywhere, or do
[anything], because it’s like . . . I have to pay for this, and I’m
stressed out about it, so I’m not very fun because I’m anxious
about it.300
Felix noted, “I think my experience with debt is probably very
similar to a lot of folks. Again, as I read more I find that . . .
crippling fear created by debt is incredibly commonplace.”301 Ken
had a similar sentiment: “I think [my experience with education
debt is] typical for millennials. Every millennial I know, or most of
them, are working too hard, they’re stressed out, they’re angry,
frustrated. They may or may not have substance abuse problems
or mental health issues that are exacerbated by all of this.”302
Others referenced sadness related to their education debt. Lindsey
explained:
I am making that kind of salary that should be going to
retirement, and instead I’m paying down debt. That seems
weird. That feels scary, and not great. And thinking
about . . . anytime I think about just cooling down on the
number of clients that I take or any of that, it’s just like this
giant . . . it’s a tidal wave. It’s like, slow that down and this
is just gonna completely consume you.303
299. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 96 (citing a 2015 study finding that
student loan debtors reported “lower levels of psychological health, controlling for other
factors such as occupation, income, education, and family wealth”); Kristy L. Archuleta et
al., College Students and Financial Distress: Exploring Debt, Financial Satisfaction, and
Financial Anxiety, 24 J. FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 50, 50–51 (2013) (finding that debt was
not a statistically significant factor in students’ financial anxiety, but recognizing that
“financial anxiety may not occur until after graduation when recent graduates face the
realization of their debt and its impact on their financial situation.”); LeMay & Cloud, supra
note 95, at 102 (“As one can see an endless cycle of despair and hopelessness can be created
for those not prepared to repay their student loans.”). But cf. Dwyer et al., supra note 27,
at 733–34 (longitudinal study of young adults on the relationship between accumulated
debt, including education debt, and feelings of mastery and self-esteem, finding that (1)
debt contributes to a greater sense of mastery and self-esteem for young adults because it
represents reasoned investment in status attainment; (2) results are stronger for low- and
middle-income borrowers and blunted for upper-income borrowers; and (3) positive
attribution of debt decreases with age as the burdens of repayment begin to outweigh the
positive feelings associated with consumption).
300. Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018).
301. Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017).
302. Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018).
303. Interview with Texas Borrower Twelve (Feb. 19, 2018). Others share the same
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Shame was also a connective tissue in the interviews. Sarah did
not want to expose her student debt to her friends because she
“would feel ashamed because I feel like they know me as somebody
who works really, really hard. And then, if they knew . . . I
wouldn’t want to make them feel sorry for me.”304 And at least
three others talked about the shame of having debt and needing
financial advice.305
Distress emotions and shame can exacerbate the information
ostrich effect.306 Approximately one in five respondents in our
sample mentioned either: (1) that they would prefer not to think
about their education debt; (2) that they did not feel comfortable
discussing their debt or finances with others; or (3) both.307
Distress emotions and related avoidance can lead borrowers to
avoid dealing with the debt itself. A few comments are illustrative.
Felix recalled, “the amount of debt was so much and so
overwhelming I stopped checking my mail. I stopped engaging my
e-mail. The bills, sometimes I had the money to pay and it was so
overwhelming to engage that I just avoided it.”308 Andrew
admitted, “[f]or a while I was trying to escape it. Basically, it’s been
like this 800[-]pound gorilla on my back.”309 For many of our
sentiment. See Interview with New York Borrower Two (Oct. 16, 2017); Interview with
Texas Borrower Thirteen (Feb. 20, 2018).
304. Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018).
305. Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017); Interview with Kansas
Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower Nine (Sept. 3, 2017).
306. There has been a significant amount of research on stigma and avoidance in the
bankruptcy field. See Alycia Chin et al., Consumer Bankruptcy Stigma: Understanding
Relationships with Familiarity and Perceived Control, 53 J. CONSUMER AFF. 600, 613–14
(2019) (finding that attitudes about bankruptcy and bankruptcy filers are affected by firsthand experience, feelings of morality, warmth, and competence, and filer’s control of her
financial circumstances); Sousa, supra note 130, at 460, 464–65 (interviews with debtors
who filed bankruptcy showed a link between the stigma and shame of a debtor’s inability
to pay her debt and a debtor’s decision to put off or avoid filing for bankruptcy); Deborah
Thorne & Leon Anderson, Managing the Stigma of Personal Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS
77, 83 (2006) (interviews with couples who filed bankruptcy evidenced a link between the
shame of financial insecurity and avoiding filing for bankruptcy).
307. Interview with California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with Illinois
Borrower One (Jan. 17, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018);
Interview with Illinois Borrower Three (Jan. 17, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower
Six (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Twelve (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with
Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower Two (Aug. 30,
2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower Four (Aug. 31, 2017); Interview with Kansas
Borrower Five (Aug. 30, 2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017);
Interview with New York Borrower One (Oct. 15, 2017); Interview with Texas Borrower Six
(Feb. 17, 2018); Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018).
308. Interview with Kansas Borrower One (Aug. 30, 2017). Another respondent echoed
this sentiment. See Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17, 2018) (“Yeah, we’re
dodging phone calls.”).
309. Interview with California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018).
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respondents, avoidance meant trying to defer or forbear their
loans for as long as possible. At least twenty-nine of our sixty-five
respondents mentioned placing their loans in deferment310 or
forbearance,311 or otherwise failing to pay them.312 Sasha noted,
“my biggest skill in life learning, in how to manage these loans is
just to go back to school and avoid them. Because the longer I’m in
school, the more I can defer them . . . . And I like being in school,
so maybe I could just do this till I die.”313 At least eight of our
respondents defaulted on their loans.314
The student debt cascade, for these borrowers, ends with
significant financial repercussions. For those who enter
forbearance, interest continues to accrue and is capitalized into
the principal of the loan at the end of the forbearance period.315
310. Interview with California Borrower Three (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with
California Borrower Ten (Apr. 15, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17,
2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Seven (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with Illinois
Borrower Ten (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Thirteen (Jan. 20, 2018);
Interview with Kansas Borrower Three (Aug. 30, 2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower
Four (Aug. 31, 2017); Interview with Kansas Borrower Five (Aug. 30, 2017); Interview with
Kansas Borrower Six (Aug. 31, 2017); Interview with New York Borrower Five (Oct. 16,
2017); Interview with North Carolina Borrower One (Aug. 4, 2017); Interview with North
Carolina Borrower Two (Aug. 4, 2017); Interview with North Carolina Borrower Five (Apr.
4, 2018); Interview with North Carolina Borrower Seven (Apr. 5, 2018); Interview with
Texas Borrower Five (Feb. 17, 2018).
311. Interview with California Borrower One (Apr. 13, 2018); Interview with
California Borrower Four (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with California Borrower Five (Apr.
14, 2018); Interview with Kansas Borrower Nine (Sept. 3, 2017); Interview with New York
Borrower Two (Oct. 16, 2017); Interview with New York Borrower Seven (Oct. 17, 2017);
Interview with North Carolina Borrower Six (Apr. 4, 2018); Interview with Texas Borrower
Two (Feb. 17, 2018); Interview with Texas Borrower Eleven (Feb. 19, 2018); Interview with
Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018). It was clear from the context of the interviews that
the respondents were not clear about the difference between deferment and forbearance
and of which program they had taken advantage.
312. Interview with California Borrower Two (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with
California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018).
313. Interview with Illinois Borrower Ten (Jan. 20, 2018).
314. Although neither the survey nor the interviewers specifically asked about default,
it became clear in certain interviews. See Interview with California Borrower Three (Apr.
14, 2018); Interview with California Borrower Four (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with
California Borrower Five (Apr. 14, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Two (Jan. 17,
2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower Six (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with Illinois Borrower
Seven (Jan. 20, 2018); Interview with Texas Borrower Three (Feb. 17, 2018); Interview with
Texas Borrower Thirteen (Feb. 20, 2018); Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20,
2018).
315. Forbearance, FED. STUDENT AID (Aug. 19, 2015, 1:09 PM), https://studentaidhelp
.ed.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/295/~/forbearance [https://perma.cc/HQ27-F9CS] (“Unpaid
interest that accrues during the forbearance will be added to the principal balance
(capitalized) of your loan(s), increasing the total amount you owe”); see also AKERS &
CHINGOS, supra note 25, at 119–20 (discussing allegations that student loan servicers have
engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment of borrowers, and otherwise failed borrowers when
it comes to navigating repayment).

57 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2019)

2019]

THE INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE

59

For many, this leads to a ballooning debt. Ken described his
experience:
I exhausted all of my deferments, forbearance, benefits.
When I graduated the total amount of money owed was only
like [forty-five] thousand dollars, but everything kept
gaining interest for the next four years. By the time I was
making payments, the total of everything was about
[seventy-two] thousand, [seventy-four] thousand dollars.316
For those who are more than ninety days delinquent on their
loans, their credit rating suffers.317 And for those who do default,
the financial toll of the collections process can be massive—the
federal government can seize tax returns, social security
payments, or earned income tax credits, garnish wages, or put a
freeze on additional loan money or transcripts.318 According to one
borrower who experienced such collection measures, they are
“ugly, it’s disgusting” and “kind of like being treated like a
second[-]class citizen.”319 A borrower’s credit can be destroyed,
which can affect her ability to seek additional credit, buy or rent a
home, or get a job.320 Especially in light of the fact that data have
shown that the federal government expends more money collecting
debt than it recovers,321 it is difficult to see the value in the
punitive policies. Punitive and stigmatizing collection tools punish
borrowers and may lead to further stigmatization and
exacerbation of the student debt cascade.322 But the devastating
individual outcomes are masked by the investment imperative,
which prioritizes higher education above all else—even a lifetime
of debt collection, stress, and shame.
V. CONCLUSION
The investment imperative is alive and well in America. It is
baked in to federal higher education policy and woven into the
fabric of higher education institutions. It drives prospective
316. Interview with Texas Borrower Fifteen (Feb. 20, 2018).
317. What is Delinquency?, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loa
ns/default#delinquency [https://perma.cc/JMM3-RREW] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
318. Rendleman & Weingart, supra note 121, at 247–51.
319. Interview with Texas Borrower Thirteen (Feb. 20, 2018).
320. Greene, supra note 131, at 260–62 (discussing the increasing use of credit score
and credit report as a gatekeeper for jobs, rental units, car insurance, and utility security
deposits).
321. Shahien Nasiripour, Americans Are Paying $38 to Collect $1 of Student Debt,
BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2017, 8:39 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0519/americans-are-paying-38-to-collect-1-of-student-debt.
322. Like the scholarly work around stigma in bankruptcy, see supra note 306, it is
necessary to engage in more quantitative, qualitative, and interdisciplinary work to
understand the role of shame and stigma in higher education financing and debt collection.
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students toward higher education and justifies the current creditbased financing of higher education. And it drives and distorts
consumer decision-making around higher education and student
debt. The way that the investment imperative has driven higher
education policy and distorted consumers’ decisions has
consequences, the negative effects of which are disproportionally
experienced by vulnerable communities that have historically had
less equal access to higher education and other avenues to
financial and social mobility. Those consequences and effects are
not simply theoretical; they have a real effect on real people. By
combining theoretical and empirical research with qualitative
data, this Article sheds light on how the investment imperative
affects individuals on the ground.323
This contribution is just a beginning, adding a legal
perspective to an interdisciplinary conversation; scholars from
across disciplines are newly engaged in the project of exploring
how the legal requirements and structures of higher education
affect students, particularly those who rely on credit to finance
their education. As higher education becomes more expensive, less
regulated, and more critical to success in the labor market, it is
more important than ever to understand the full implications of
the investment imperative.324 If policymakers want to deal with
the student debt crisis, they must understand how the current
framework drives and distorts decisions on both the supply and
demand side. Thus, the data and arguments presented in this
Article offer an important, and underrepresented, perspective.

323. Greene, supra note 131, at 242 (“What is often absent from [theoretical] accounts,
however, is what we can glean only by engaging in in-depth interviews with those directly
affected by the legal rules, systems, and processes we study: an understanding of how, in
their actual social contexts, these actors experience, understand, and internalize the
relevant legal rules and structures, and how these structures become sources of personal
meaning and determinants of behavior.”).
324. There is much more work to be done to understand the full effects of the
investment imperative. Query, for example, whether the investment imperative provides
justification for constricting the social safety net or otherwise limiting programs that aid
the poor and middle-class. The argument would proceed as follows: Through education debt,
the government makes higher education accessible to the majority of Americans. Higher
education is the key to upward socioeconomic mobility. Therefore, individual Americans
simply need to take advantage of the access to achieve socioeconomic success. Thus, there
is no need for a strong social safety net. Of course, for the reasons explained herein—
information asymmetry, exploitation of vulnerable borrowers, illegal or unethical conduct
by lenders or servicers, systemic and institutional barriers, lack of equal or fair access,
unequal debt loads, and labor market changes—we know that access to higher education is
insufficient to level the economic playing field. Yet, until we recognize the full effects of the
investment imperative, access to higher education will be stymied in its efforts to displace
systemic or institutional inequalities.

